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Of Religion and Redemption: 
 
Evidence from Default on Islamic Loans 
 
 
Abstract 
We compare default rates on conventional and Islamic loans using a comprehensive monthly 
dataset from Pakistan that follows more than 150,000 loans over the period 2006:04 to 
2008:12. We find robust evidence that the default rate on Islamic loans is less than half the 
default rate on conventional loans. Islamic loans are less likely to default during Ramadan 
and in big cities if the share of votes to religious-political parties increases, suggesting that 
religion – either through individual piousness or network effects – may play a role in 
determining loan default. 
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Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing parts of the financial sector. Doubled in 
size since 2006 and already accounting for $900 billion or more than 1 percent of the global 
banking market (Financial Times, May 12, 2011), “the global potential of the Islamic 
banking market is conservatively estimated at $4,000 billion, according to Moody’s Investor 
Service” (Financial Times, July 8, 2008). The financial crisis may have spurred its growth 
and potential market share even further, as observers claim the “principles based on religious 
law insulate the industry from the worst of the financial crisis” (Washington Post, October 
31, 2008; see also the International Monetary Fund report by Hasan and Dridi (2010)). In 
particular, the asset-based and risk sharing nature of Islamic finance as well as the obligation 
to only engage in products that limit excessive leverage and disruptive financial innovation 
may have shielded Islamic banking from the impact of the crisis. 
Yet despite the fast growth of Islamic banking and the imperative claims made about 
the built-in protection against excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, no research (we 
are aware of) so far has investigated the default rate of individual conventional versus Islamic 
loans. This lack of evidence should not come as a surprise, because the identification 
challenges, and corresponding data requirements, faced by such an analysis are steep. 
Borrowers seeking Islamic financing and banks granting it may differ from their conventional 
counterparts in many observable and unobservable characteristics. Whether therefore the 
difference in credit risk in conventional and Islamic financing is mainly due to compliance 
with the principles of Islamic law (the Shari’ah) per se, or is due to borrower, loan contract 
and/or bank characteristics that are independent of any Islamic rulings remains an open 
question we aim to address in this paper. 
The data set we employ covers all business loans that were outstanding in Pakistan 
during the period 2006:4 to 2008:12. The Credit Information Bureau (CIB) database, that we 
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use, is maintained by the Consumer Protection Department of the State Bank of Pakistan and 
is also analyzed in Khwaja and Mian (2005), Mian (2006), Khwaja and Mian (2008), and Zia 
(2008) for example. The country and sample period provide a unique setting to analyze the 
credit risk in Islamic loans.1 
Pakistan may be one of the few countries in the world where both well-developed 
conventional and Islamic banking sectors have co-existed for a considerable period of time. 
Though the characteristics of borrowers, loan contracts and banks may differ between 
conventional and Islamic loans, their co-existence in Pakistan offers a unique opportunity to 
assess the effect of religion on the loan default rate. The majority of Islamic loans granted in 
Pakistan are simple and standard equivalents to conventional loans, and therefore comparable 
to these conventional loans and to similar Islamic loans in other countries. In fact, the pure 
profit-loss sharing contracts, i.e., Mudaraba and Musharakah, constitute less than 3 percent of 
all loans in our sample, compared to 43 percent for Murabahah financing (which is most 
similar to a term loan), 22 percent for Diminishing Musharakah (most similar to mortgage 
finance or hire purchase), and 24 percent for Ijarah and Ijarah wa'Iqtina (most similar to a 
leasing contract). We discuss those contracts in more detail below. Another unique feature of 
our dataset is that quite a few firms and banks repeatedly and concurrently engage in both 
conventional and Islamic type financing providing unique opportunities for advanced 
empirical identification. 
                                                 
 
1 Consistent with the practices of the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan, we 
henceforth employ the terms “conventional” and “Islamic loan”, despite that because they involve no interest 
payments and almost always consist of multiple underlying contracts, scholars are often hesitant to label many 
of the Islamic financial products we will study as “loans” (Kuran (2004)) or even as “Islamic” (see the 
discussion in Pepinsky (2010) and Khan (2010b) for example). 
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Estimating a variety of empirical models that contain pertinent combinations of 
borrower, loan contract and bank characteristics, and even when saturating the models with 
year*month, borrower, bank and borrower*bank fixed effects, we find robust evidence that 
Islamic loans are less likely to be overdue for 90 (or 180) days on their payments than 
conventional loans. This estimated wedge in these default rates is not only statistically 
significant, but also economically relevant. In duration models the hazard rate on Islamic 
loans is estimated to be less than half the hazard rate on conventional loans. 
The specifications saturated with borrower*bank fixed effects rule out the possibility 
that observed and/or unobserved borrower, bank and/or borrower-bank relationship 
heterogeneity are potential explanations for the large observed default differential. 
Differences in loan characteristics can also be ruled out because − as indicated earlier − the 
contracted cash flows for the bulk of the Islamic loans in Pakistan are exactly the same as 
those of their equivalent conventional loans. Indeed, even when pairing simple and common 
Murabahah loans with their most similar conventional counterparts (i.e., term finance and 
working capital loans) of the same maturity (i.e., shorter than one year) and of the same 
collateralization status, the large default differential remains present. 
Our hypothesis, which we develop in detail in Section I.C., is that the lower default 
rates on Islamic loans is due to the more acute conflict that pious borrowers have with their 
individual religious beliefs or those of their fellow believers when defaulting on an Islamic 
loan (Iannaccone (1998) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006)). 
While the most fervent religious believers may obtain Islamic loans only, intermediate 
believers may mix conventional and Islamic borrowing (a widely observed practice which 
permits our estimations with borrower fixed effects). Though mixed borrowers may default 
due to nature or their own actions (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), the more pious ones 
among them may choose (and are legally and observably able) to default on their 
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conventional rather than on their Islamic loans. Our finding that the hazard rate on Islamic 
loans of the same borrower taking both conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank is 
only one fifth the hazard rate on conventional loans confirms the second hypothesis that we 
develop, i.e., that the same borrower is less likely to default on an Islamic than on a 
conventional loan. 
Suggestive of religious motivation is further our finding that Islamic loans are less 
likely to default during Ramadan, a period of greater religious orientation, and in big cities if 
the share of votes to religious-political parties increases. Family and related social networks 
may be weaker in big cities and the increase in the share of votes to religious-political parties, 
which in cities are even more distinct from other political parties than in rural areas, 
strengthens the role of alternative religious-social networks. Prospective borrowers and loan 
officers may meet at mosques, for example, which may serve as informal credit registries. 
Khwaja, Mian and Qamar (2011) estimate the value of membership in such large yet diffuse 
network – in their case a business network - for the access to bank credit and financial 
viability using 1999 – 2003 data on the composition of the boards of directors of all firms in 
Pakistan.2 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I explains the basic tenets of Islamic 
banking. This section also introduces our corresponding theoretical framework on loan 
default and the resultant testable hypotheses. Section II introduces the data and the 
methodology. Section III discusses the empirical results. Section IV concludes. 
 
                                                 
 
2 The common bond present in credit unions around the world may fulfill a similar role (McKillop and Wilson 
(2011)). Ostergaard, Schindele and Vale (2013) for example find that savings banks located in Norwegian 
communities with high social capital have a higher probability of survival and lower loan losses, though they 
stress the role social capital plays in facilitating collective decision-making at these banks. 
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I. Islamic Banking and Loan Default 
A. Islamic Banking 
Islamic Banking refers to a system of banking or banking practices that is consistent, 
both in objectives and operations, with the Shari’ah. The main principles are either directly 
based on the Qur’an and the sayings and actions of the prophet Mohammed, or on a growing 
body of Islamic jurisprudence that is being developed by Islamic scholars. The key 
distinguishing features of Islamic Banking - the prohibition of interest (riba), excessive 
leverage, and its focus on risk sharing – may make Islamic banks quite different from 
conventional banks. Recently published and ongoing has found that Islamic banks may be 
less efficient, but at the same time also less exposed to credit risk than conventional banks 
and that many Islamic banks have high-quality assets and are therefore more stable than their 
conventional counterparts (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi (2013), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Merrouche (2013), Pappas, Izzeldin, Fuertes and Ongena (2013), Van Wijnbergen and 
Zaheer (2013); see also Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
B. Islamic Loan Contracts 
Ideal modes of Islamic financing are based on the profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) 
paradigm. Examples of such arrangements include Musharakah which is a partnership where 
all partners invest both money and expertise and Mudarabah which is a partnership with 
some partners investing only money and others only their skills/labor (we provide details on 
the different types of Islamic financing in (online) Appendix A). The ex-ante fixed rate of 
return common in conventional loan products is replaced by a return that is uncertain and 
dependent on the borrowing company's realized profits, which make these two financing 
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structures compatible with Shari’ah principles. Notice that both Musharakah and Mudarabah 
bear very little resemblance with interest-bearing contracts in conventional banking, which 
would make it problematic to compare their respective default rates. In practice, however, 
PLS contracts only constitute a small share of the market for Islamic loans products. In fact, 
in our sample, less than 3 percent of all Islamic loans are based on the PLS principle.3 The 
low share of PLS lending contracts is not specific to Pakistan. Chong and Liu (2009), for 
instance, find that only 0.5 percent of Islamic loans in Malaysia adopt the PLS paradigm. 
Instead, Islamic banks have developed lending structures that, while being Shari’ah 
compliant, largely mimic the characteristics of conventional lending products. In a 
Murabahah contract (which is the contract most equivalent to a term loan), the bank first 
purchases a real asset from a supplier, and consequently sells it in a different contract at a 
marked-up price to the borrower. Interest rate payments are implicit as the borrower pays the 
markup price in installments over a period of time or in lump sum at maturity of the contract. 
This contract is permissible because trade in general is allowed and also the bank is 
technically exposed to risk between the moment it takes legal possession of the underlying 
asset (first contract) and the moment it transfers the asset to the borrower (second contract), 
even if in practice this moment is often very short. 
Similarly, Islamic leasing products have been developed. In case of Ijarah, the bank 
buys an asset for a customer and then leases it to the customer for a certain period at a fixed 
rental charge. Islamic law allows rent to be charged because the customer enjoys the usufruct 
of the good while the bank bears the risk of ownership. Ijarah wa'Iqtina is similar to an Ijarah 
                                                 
 
3 Often quoted reasons include agency problems, lack of well-defined property laws, the restrictive role of 
shareholders in management, or a disadvantageous tax treatment. Many banks, facing competition from 
conventional banks, may consider PLS contracts as being too risky.  
 
7 
 
contract except that it allows for the possibility that the customer becomes owner of the good 
at the end of the lease contract, either for free (gift) or at a pre-agreed price. Finally, in a 
diminishing Musharakah contract, a financier and his client participate either in the joint 
ownership of a property or an equipment. What is different, however, is that the share of the 
financier is divided into a number of units, which at pre-agreed moments in time will be 
purchased by the client. Each period, the client’s share increases until all units are bought and 
he fully owns the property or asset. Rent is paid to the financier according to his remaining 
share in the project. 
C. Theoretical Framework Regarding Default on Conventional and Islamic Loans 
The previous section showed that the most popular Islamic lending products are 
functionally identical to conventional loan products.4 Does this mean that we should also 
expect their default rates to be similar? Clearly, Islamic loans are structured differently and 
are governed by different contracts than conventional loans. Moreover, there can be different 
motivations to prefer one form of banking over the other. For example borrowers may choose 
conventional over Islamic banks because of easy accessibility or specific product needs. If 
proximity of the closest bank branch or suitability of product is the overriding reason to 
choose one type of loan over the other, we do not necessarily expect that the default rate on 
either type of loans will systematically differ. 
Nevertheless we think that interesting testable hypotheses can be formed regarding the 
motivation for preferring one form of credit over the other and the expected default rates 
associated with that choice. The existence of Islamic banking per se is based on religion and 
                                                 
 
4 Apart from being functionally identical, conventional and Islamic loans are also subject to a similar tax 
treatment in Pakistan, in contrast to Malaysia for example where Islamic financing enjoys tax advantages. 
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for borrowers taking an Islamic loan plainly is a real economic decision (i.e., “putting your 
money where your mouth is”). An Islamic loan is – after all – a financial product with certain 
characteristics one of which is its accordance with the Shari’ah. The text that prohibits 
interest payments, i.e., Al Quran and Hadith, also prohibits the misappropriation of other 
people’s properties (i.e., “the eating other people’s money in an unlawful way”). Those who 
choose to stick to one rule (i.e., the avoidance of interest payments) are expected to have a 
higher propensity to follow the other rule (i.e., do not default) as well. Put differently, 
borrowers are likely to base their borrowing and default decisions on a rational comparison of 
the associated costs of the respective loan contracts. They, when choosing a loan, also take 
into account the expected cost of default which in the case of a default on an Islamic loan will 
include possibly acute negative feelings of discordance between intimate religious beliefs and 
loan outcome. 
Following this fundamental prior we propose the following simple framework on the 
basis of which we derive three distinct testable hypotheses (Figure 1 summarizes the main 
building blocks and the three testable hypotheses; a model in Box 1 illustrates the main 
intuition). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
We start from the premise that if a person is more personally pious or religiously 
networked she is ceteris paribus more likely to apply for an Islamic loan than for a 
conventional loan. To obtain an Islamic loan the applicant has to approach either an Islamic 
bank or an Islamic branch of a mixed bank which uniquely grant this type of loans. For a 
conventional loan, on the other hand, the (possibly more secular) applicant needs to approach 
either a conventional bank or a conventional branch of a mixed bank which uniquely grant 
that type of loans. 
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We further posit that an Islamic bank or branch is ceteris paribus more likely to grant a 
(Islamic) loan to a more personally pious or religiously networked person.5 From this we can 
deduce that the more personally pious or religiously networked are more likely to have 
Islamic loans granted by an Islamic bank or branch (which by no means exclude the 
possibility that these borrowers may also have some conventional loans). 
Next, we presume that a more personally pious or religiously networked borrower is 
less likely to default on a loan (i.e., on any loan) than a more secular borrower. We further 
posit that if a more pious or networked borrower has multiple loans outstanding she is less 
likely to default on those loans that are deemed to be in closest accordance with her religious 
tenets. Islamic loans should clearly be considered to be more in accordance with her religious 
tenets than conventional loans, while Islamic loans from Islamic banks are likely to be 
considered to be more so than Islamic loans from Islamic branches (as these branches will be 
part of a mixed bank). 
In sum, the outlined direct match between applicants, banks and contracts suggests the 
following three testable null hypotheses (between parentheses we mention for simplicity a 
one-sided alternative hypothesis though we will conservatively test its two-sided equivalent): 
                                                 
 
5 Banks may also be concerned about the differential judicial risk in Islamic lending (Jobst (2007)), as can turn 
both to Shari’ah courts, which rule on a case-by-case basis and to regular courts which may also turn the 
Shari’ah when faced with an Islamic loan. To avoid this “double jeopardy” banks may screen Islamic loan 
applicants more strictly or evergreen non-performing Islamic loans by rolling them into new Islamic loans or 
even conventional loans. All these actions will likely mitigate (or at least delay) Islamic loan default. On the 
other hand, conventional loans can also be challenged on the basis of the Shari’ah. Moreover, most 
(conventional and Islamic) loans in our dataset are highly standardized and hence carry minimal judicial risk, 
and our definition of loan default (i.e., a 90-day non-performance) far pre-dates any possible judicial activity. 
For all these reasons we can all but rule out the practical relevancy of differential judicial risk for our estimates. 
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Hypothesis 1: Across all borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally (less) 
likely to default than conventional loans. This is also (especially) the case for those Islamic 
loans that are granted by an Islamic bank. 
Hypothesis 2: For the same borrower, any Islamic loan taken is equally (less) likely to 
default than any conventional loan that is taken. 
Hypothesis 3: For more personally pious or religiously networked borrowers, ceteris 
paribus, Islamic loans are equally (less) likely to default. 
 
To test these hypotheses our analysis will need to rely on a variety of borrower, loan 
contract and bank controls and fixed effects to account for both observed and unobserved 
borrower, loan contract and bank heterogeneity. 
II. Data and Methodology 
A. Data Description 
We analyze loan level data obtained from the Consumer Protection Department (CPD) 
of the State Bank of Pakistan that maintains the domestic credit registry, i.e., the Credit 
Information Bureau (CIB). The monthly available data covers all business loans outstanding 
in Pakistan from 2006:4 to 2008:12, including both the run-up to and the financial crisis itself 
(for 16 months each if one takes 2007:08 as the start date of the crisis).6 All loans were 
                                                 
 
6 As the financial sector still maintains limited, albeit growing, linkages with global financial markets, Pakistan 
has been relatively well-insulated against contagion coming from international financial markets (Mansoor Ali 
(2009)). In fact, discount rates remained rather high for the entire sample period to address significant 
macroeconomic imbalances in the domestic economy. 
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granted in the local currency, the Pakistani rupee (code: PKR. 1 USD ~ 79 PKR, 1 EUR ~ 
110 PKR on December 31st, 2008). 
All banks in Pakistan are required to consult the CIB to verify the credit history of a 
loan applicant if the application exceeds PKR 500,000, and this requirement is similar for 
conventional and Islamic loans. The CIB data set is also, therefore, thought to be of good 
quality and has already been studied in different contexts by Khwaja and Mian (2005), Mian 
(2006), Khwaja and Mian (2008), and Zia (2008) for example.7 
For each loan contract the CIB records the identity code and total exposure of the 
borrower and his location and industry. While we do not have financial information on the 
borrowers other than the precise loan characteristics, we do know that each borrower meets a 
specific threshold of financial soundness and is required to have a debt to equity ratio of 4:1 
or better, and a current ratio of at least 1. Deviations from these requirements are allowed 
only in exceptional cases. 
The CIB further reports key loan characteristics, such as the exact financial loan 
product name, default status, maturity, collateralization, whether cash is immediately 
disbursed or whether the loan is contingent, loan use for export or agricultural purposes, the 
approved limit and the remaining outstanding amount. The loan rate is also available for a 
subset of loans. Finally, the CIB records a unique and matching code for the lending bank and 
the branch where the loan is granted. 
                                                 
 
7 As in these papers we do not observe loan need and/or demand to account for the “double” selection bias. 
Neither do we observe loan applications to study the approval of applications and/or loan granting. But we are 
mainly interested in the differential loan default probabilities and control for observed and unobserved loan 
contract, borrower, bank, borrower-bank and time heterogeneity with combinations of characteristics and fixed 
effects. 
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Our analysis of individual loan performance commences from the point when a unique 
credit decision is made. We therefore focus on new loans and loans that are renewed, 
extended or altered during the sample period. If a borrower obtains two different credit lines 
for example then both are considered as separate loans. During our 32-month sample period 
there are 1,238,574 loan-months related to distinct new loans out of a total of almost 4 
million loan-months involving 107 financial institutions. Table 2 provides the sample details. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We discard all loans given to the federal, provincial or local governments, financial 
intermediaries, autonomous bodies and public sector enterprises because these non-corporate 
borrowers either cannot default on domestic currency loans, or have different default 
dynamics that are beyond the scope of this paper. We also exclude from our analysis micro 
loans of less than PKR 50,000 (retaining them does not alter results), loans larger than PKR 
419,000,000, infrastructure and other special loans, and loans granted by financial institutions 
that are not registered as banks. 
Our final dataset consists of 603,677 complete loan-month observations, which 
corresponds to 152,730 loans granted to 22,723 borrowers by 40 different banks.8 Around 5 
percent of our sample involves Islamic loans (32,199 loan-months), that are granted either by 
one of the six Islamic banks in our sample (15,153 loan-months) or by an Islamic branch or 
subsidiary of one of the twelve “mixed” banks that offer both conventional and Islamic loans 
(17,046 loan-months). All bank names (and types) are listed in (online) Appendix B. As of 
December 2008 there were 8,225 conventional and 514 Islamic bank branches. 
                                                 
 
8 This attrition we face (which is also caused by data availability) from 107 financial institutions to 40 banks is 
similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008) who study 42 banks out 145 financial institutions. 
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About 43 percent of the Islamic financing in our sample is Murabahah financing, about 
22 percent is Diminishing Musharakah, and about 24 percent is Ijarah and Ijarah wa'Iqtina. 
The pure profit and loss sharing (partnership) contracts, Mudaraba and Musharakah, 
constitute a very small fraction of the market, i.e., only 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
Crucially for our identification strategy is the observation that within the sample period 
quite a few borrowers and banks have balance sheets containing both conventional and 
Islamic loans. As indicated in Table 3 in total 91,008 loan-months involve borrowers that 
obtain both loan types, while in total 378,649 loan-months involve one of the twelve mixed 
banks. For 17,381 loan-months the same borrower within the sample period obtains 
conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports detailed summary statistics for both conventional and Islamic loans. 
Crucial for our analysis is the definition of default. We define default to occur if 90 days after 
the maturity date or the date of an interest payment and/or installment, the debt balance 
remains unpaid. This definition for default is standard and identical for conventional and 
Islamic loans. In both cases default is not only self-reported by the banks upon prescription of 
the supervisor, but also carefully checked by the supervisor (every year around 80 percent of 
loans are randomly checked by supervisors, also for telltale signs of evergreening which if 
discovered carries penalties for the bank). Later on, we confirm the robustness of our findings 
if we define default to occur if loans payments are overdue for 180 days rather than 90 days. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We observe a substantially lower monthly default rate for Islamic compared to 
conventional loans. This difference (0.5 percent versus 0.9 percent) is not only statistically 
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significant but also economically important. The difference in monthly default rate on Islamic 
loans granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank or by an Islamic 
bank (0.7 percent versus 0.2 percent) is not statistically significant. For completeness the 
table also reports the right-censored loan duration, i.e., the time to repayment, default or end 
of the sample period. 
We measure the size of the borrower as the natural log of the sum of all credit facilities 
(loan limits) that are granted to a borrower by all banks. Borrowers with Islamic loans are 
larger and are located more often in big cities than other borrowers. 
Conventional and Islamic loans statistically differ in all contract characteristics at the 
one percent level, though the differences are often economically small. According to the 
means conventional loans have a shorter maturity (15 versus 18 months), are less likely to be 
collateralized (93 versus 99 percent) and to involve an immediate cash disbursal (74 versus 
82 percent) or a durable / fixed asset (14 versus 27 percent), are more likely to be for export 
or agricultural purposes (11 versus 4 percent and 4 versus 0 percent), and are smaller (PKR 
23 versus 35 million) than Islamic loans. Interest rates, which we observe for 239,943 loan-
months (i.e., 40 percent of our sample), are on average 2 percentage points lower for 
conventional than for Islamic loans.9 The medians point in a similar direction. Both 
conventional and Islamic loans can have a fixed or a variable “interest rate” (called “mark-up 
rate” in case of Islamic loans). 
Conventional loans are proportionally more often granted by government, specialized, 
domestic or large banks than Islamic loans. In absolute terms most conventional and Islamic 
                                                 
 
9 The higher average loan rate on Islamic loans is not inconsistent with its Islamic character, as borrowers may 
be willing to pay extra for the extra utility they get from the loans being ‘Islamic’. The 2 percent yield difference 
seems (far) too large to be explained only by the somewhat larger contractual/legal uncertainty embedded in 
Islamic relative to conventional loans. 
15 
 
loans are granted by privately (often internationally) owned and domestically incorporated 
banks, such as Meezan, Standard Chartered, RBS, Dubai Islamic, Emirates Global for 
example. 
B. Methodology 
This sub-section briefly discusses the econometric methodology employed in analyzing 
the time until repayment or default of the individual bank loans. The hazard function in 
duration analysis provides us with a suitable method for summarizing the relationship 
between the time to default and the likelihood of default. The hazard rate effectively has an 
intuitive interpretation as the per-period probability of loan default provided the loan 
“survives” up to that period. Compared to simple binary default models, duration models 
explain the time to default, while accounting for the variation in loan maturity. We therefore 
report estimates based on duration models. In particular we rely on so-called parametric 
Weibull specifications to determine the shape of the hazard function with respect to time, but 
resort to Cox (1972) proportional hazard models to handle inclusion of many fixed effects. 
Yet, our analysis commences with two representative logit specifications, whose estimates ‒ 
despite the potentially serious limitations of these models ‒ turn out to be qualitatively 
similar. 
Repayment of a loan or the sample period’s end may prevent us from ever observing a 
default on this loan. Such a loan can be considered right censored. Not knowing when the 
default would occur, means we are unable to observe the “true” time to default for these 
loans. With no adjustment to account for censoring, maximum likelihood estimation of the 
proportional hazard models produces biased and inconsistent estimates of model parameters. 
Accounting for right-censored observations will be accomplished in duration analysis by 
expressing the log-likelihood function as a weighted average of the sample density of 
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“completed” loans and the survivor function of “uncompleted” loans. As the sample period 
runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12, but the median loan maturity is only twelve months, about 5 
percent of all loans are right-censored because of the sample period’s end. As our sample 
consists out of only new loans granted from 2006:04 onwards, there is no left censoring 
problem. 
III. Empirical Results 
A. First Specifications 
Table 5 presents maximum likelihood estimation results for different duration models. 
As a starting point, however, we first report estimates from parsimonious logit specifications 
(Models I to III). The dependent variable in Model I equals one if the loan defaults and equals 
zero otherwise and we retain only those 122,331 loans that are either repaid or defaulted 
within the sample period. The dependent variable in Models II and III equals one if the loan 
defaults in a certain month, and equals zero otherwise, and in this specification all 152,730 
loans (also those that are right-censored) are included given that the estimation in this case is 
done at the loan-month level (there are 603,677 loan-months). 
The estimated intercept terms in Models I and II that equal -3.228*** and -4.752***,10 
respectively, imply a probability of default for conventional lending that equals 4.3 percent 
per loan (= e-3.228/[e-3.228+1]) and 0.9 percent per loan-month (= e-4.752/[e-4.752+1]), which 
equals the mean probability of default per month of conventional loans reported in Table 4. 
The estimated coefficients on the Islamic Loan dummy that equal -0.500*** and -0.612***, 
respectively, suggest that the odds ratio almost halves when a loan is Islamic to 2.6 and 0.5 
                                                 
 
10 As in the Tables, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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percent, respectively (e-3.228-0.500/[e-3.228-0.500+1] and e-4.752-0.612/[e-4.752-0.612+1]). Results are 
unaffected when we add borrower, loan, and bank characteristics to the logit specification in 
Model III. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Because we want to account for duration dependence, our main empirical results are 
established using duration models. Columns IV to VII report results from a duration model 
that uses the Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function.11 In all parametric models 
errors are clustered at the borrower level. Model IV features only the Islamic loan dummy 
(and an intercept) and in Model V we add borrower size as well as 7 borrower region and 67 
borrower industry dummies (all regions and industries are listed in (online) Appendix C) and 
loan characteristics. In Model VI, we additionally control for bank type and time (i.e., 
year*month) fixed effects. In Model VII, we distinguish between Islamic loans that are 
granted by Islamic branches/subsidiaries of conventional banks and Islamic loans that are 
granted by Islamic banks. 
The coefficient for the Islamic Loan dummy is negative and highly statistically 
significant in all specifications. This is the first main result of our paper: The hazard rate is 
substantially lower for an Islamic than for a conventional loan, allowing us to reject our first 
null hypothesis (H.1) which states that across all borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are 
equally likely to default than conventional loans. 
                                                 
 
11 In the next step we employ Cox proportional hazard models where the baseline hazard is left un-
parameterized (we also estimate accelerated failure time models with a log-logistic distribution; results are 
similar and not further reported). 
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This effect is robust (we will show) to many additional controls, including borrower, 
bank, and borrower*bank fixed effects and is economically large. Though we return later to 
economic relevancy in more detail, by way of preview: The coefficient in Model VI for 
example implies that the hazard rate of an Islamic loan is only 2/3rd (= e-0.402) of the hazard 
rate on a conventional loan. 
Model VII further shows that especially Islamic loans granted by Islamic banks have a 
lower hazard rate (allowing us to reject the second part of H.1 as well). The hazard rate of 
Islamic loans issued by Islamic branches or subsidiaries of conventional banks, though lower, 
is not statistically different from that of all conventional loans. However, our analysis in 
Table 7 will show that the hazard rate of Islamic loans issued by Islamic branches or 
subsidiaries of these mixed banks is statistically lower than the hazard rate of the 
conventional loans issued by these mixed banks. Hence the picture that arises is that Islamic 
loans issued by Islamic banks have the lowest hazard rate and that conventional loans issued 
by purely conventional banks have a lower hazard rate than those issued by mixed banks. 
Before further model developments, however, we briefly review the estimated 
coefficients on the control variables. In our sample, we do not find a robust relationship 
between borrower size and hazard rates. With respect to loan characteristics, we find the 
hazard rate to be higher for loans with a longer maturity and those involving an immediate 
cash disbursal (in which case borrowers likely have to start paying back sooner), but lower 
for collateralized and agricultural loans (though the statistical significance of these findings 
later disappears somewhat). 
Hazard rates are significantly higher for loans issued by government banks and by 
those belonging to the largest five banks by loan volume, but lower for loans issued by 
foreign banks. Our finding of higher hazard rates for loans issued by government banks is 
consistent with results in Khwaja and Mian (2005), who find that loans given to politically 
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connected firms by government banks in particular tend to have to up to 50 percent higher 
default rates. Note that at this point we do not include bank fixed effects (yet) because these 
effects would be perfectly correlated with the Islamic loan dummy for (loans granted by) the 
purely conventional or Islamic banks. We include bank fixed effects later on when we focus 
on the mixed banks (Section III.C, Table 7). Finally, we note that the parameter α is 
measuring the duration dependence in the baseline hazard specification and that this 
estimated parameter is not significantly different from one, indicating that there is neither 
positive nor negative duration dependence. 
Borrower, loan and/or bank characteristics that differ between conventional and Islamic 
loans may be responsible for the estimated difference in the hazard rates. We now 
systematically investigate each of these possible sources of variation. 
B. Differences between Borrowers that Obtain Conventional and Islamic Loans? 
Models V and VI in Table 5 control for borrower size, region, and industry, for 
example, yet these controls may not capture all borrower heterogeneity. In Model VIII we, 
therefore, include borrower fixed effects to capture all time-invariant unobservable and 
observable borrower heterogeneity in a Cox proportional hazard model that leaves the 
baseline hazard un-parameterized (including this many fixed effects in a Weibull 
specification is technically impossible in our setting). We designate this specification as our 
benchmark. Notice that we are able to control for borrower fixed effects because our dataset 
includes borrowers that have both conventional and Islamic loans (we label such borrowers 
as “mixed borrowers”), some of which default on one or more loans but not on others (this is 
possible given our 90 days loan-specific definition of non-performance). 
We find that the parameter estimate for the Islamic loan dummy remains negative and 
statistically significant. Moreover, its magnitude is comparable to the other specifications, 
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and even slightly more negative than in the previous most complete specification without 
borrower fixed effects (in Model VI). Hence these estimates indicate that within the 32-
month sample period (but controlling for year*month fixed effects) the same borrower is 
more likely to default on a conventional loan than on an Islamic loan, allowing us also to 
reject our second null hypothesis (H.2) which states that for the same borrower, any Islamic 
loan taken is equally likely to default than any conventional loan that is taken. We revisit this 
finding, and especially its potential relationship with religion, in Section III.E. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
For our benchmark Model VIII we more closely assess the economic relevancy of our 
findings for a one-year (median), collateralized, cash loan that is not for export or agricultural 
purposes, or granted by a government, specialized, foreign or large bank. Figure 2 displays 
the resulting schedule of the cumulative hazard of conventional and Islamic loans 
respectively. After one year (the median loan duration), the difference in the cumulative 
hazard is already more than 2 percent. This first-year cumulative hazard rate on conventional 
loans equals 5.2 percent, not uncommon for loans in a developing economy, while the first-
year cumulative hazard rate for Islamic loans equals 3.1 percent, more equal to the default 
rates on loans commonly observed in developed economies. 
C. Differences in the Loan Contracts? 
Despite the controls for the loan maturity, collateralization, cash disbursal, and the 
export or agricultural purpose of the loan, it is still possible that differences in loan contract 
characteristics between conventional and Islamic loans would explain the difference in 
hazard rates. In Table 6 we report a set of specifications that addresses this possibility. 
We start by excluding the 45,254 non-cash facilities that may differ more between 
conventional and Islamic loans in other loan characteristics. We are left with 107,476 loans 
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and re-estimate all duration models in Table 5. Model I in Table 6 reports the estimates for 
the representative benchmark specification. Results are almost unaffected. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Our data set does not include loan seniority, possibly because seniority of small 
business loans is often by default based on their precedence in time. In Model II we therefore 
include a variable Seniority of Charge that equals one if the loan is the only one outstanding, 
and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient on this new variable is insignificant, while the 
coefficient on Islamic Loan is unaffected. 
One variable we have not included yet in the specifications, as we know it is rather 
coarsely measured, is the durability or fixity of the asset that is financed with the loan. The 
bank’s ownership claim in a Murabahah contract will be quite limited (in time) if the 
financed asset is for example an inventory of raw materials that is being used in the 
production process (recall that almost all Islamic loans are in addition also collateralized). 
Model III in Table 6 includes the variable Durable that equals one if the loan is granted for a 
durable or fixed asset, like a plant, machinery, real estate or automobile for example, and 
equals zero otherwise, in the representative benchmark model. The coefficient on this new 
variable is also insignificant, while the coefficient on Islamic Loan is again unaffected. 
Next, and to account at once for other loan characteristics that are not recorded and for 
time-varying borrower heterogeneity that is also unobservable to us but that may be 
observable to the bank, we add the loan rate (Interest Rate) in Model IV or the individual 
loan amount (Amount) in Model V. As described in the data section, we have the interest rate 
for only 40 percent of our sample observations. As expected, we find a positive relation 
between the loan rate or size, and the probability of default. However, the estimate for the 
Islamic loan dummy remains almost unaltered, i.e., -0.406** and -0.506***, respectively. 
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Next, we perform additional robustness checks with respect to collateralization and 
Islamic loan type (to conserve space we chose not to tabulate the estimated coefficients). 
Banks possibly adjust collateralization depending on borrower condition or additional 
financing, and may do so differently ─ if not in principle, then in practice ─ for the two types 
of loans. To account for this possibility we simply remove collateral from the base 
specification. The coefficient on the Islamic loan dummy remains virtually unaffected. To 
account for the potentially differential nature of collateral in conventional and Islamic lending 
we add an interaction between the Collateral and Islamic Loan dummies to our benchmark 
specification. The interaction effect is, however, not statistically significant, and the 
coefficient on the Islamic Loan dummy remains again unaffected. Similarly we add 
interactions between all loan contract characteristics and the Islamic loan dummy. With the 
exception of the negative coefficient on the interaction with maturity, none of the estimated 
coefficients on the other interactions is statistically significant, and Islamic loans are still 
found to default less likely than conventional loans. 
To account for the different types of Islamic loan contracts, in Model VI we split the 
Islamic Loan dummy into four loan type dummies, i.e., Murabahah, Diminishing 
Musharakah, Ijarah or Ijarah wa’Iqtina, and Other Islamic loans (which includes 
Mudarabah loans for example). The estimated coefficients on the four dummies equal -
0.445*, -0.886*, -0.558*, and -0.263, respectively, confirming our findings so far. 
We further exclude Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts (both types are more similar 
to equity financing than to conventional bank credit, and constitute only a tiny fraction of the 
Islamic loan market). The Islamic Loan coefficient equals -0.500** (untabulated). In Models 
VII and VIII we restrict the sample to Murabahah loans and similar conventional loans, i.e., 
term finance and working capital (excluding all other credit facilities such as mortgage 
finance, leases, export finance, agricultural finance and off-balance financing for example). In 
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Model VIII we further require that the loan maturity is shorter than one year and the loan is 
collateralized.12 In both cases results are unaffected with estimated Islamic Loan coefficients 
that equal -0.554* (Model VII) and -0.587* (Model VIII), respectively. Notice that the last 
model is very demanding given the very restricted set of loans that is retained (i.e., 44,335 out 
of 152,730 loans), yet it still manages to include loan maturity, two bank controls, and a full 
set of time and borrower fixed effects. Hence this specification shows that for the same 
borrower having both types of loans outstanding, with a maturity shorter than one year and 
collateralized, the hazard on the Murabahah loans is about half the hazard (= e-0.587) than on 
the very similar conventional loans. On the basis of these specifications we consider it 
unlikely that loan characteristics by themselves can explain the hazard differential between 
Islamic and conventional loans. 
In Model IX in Table 6 we redefine default to occur only after 180-days. Shorter 
duration or – when present – tighter covenants for example could result in earlier non-
performance. But results are again unaffected (note that though the number of loans remains 
equal to 152,730, the number of loan-months increases to 613,218, because non-performing 
loans are now right-censored 90 days later). 
Finally, in Model X we study the default on the new loans at bank branches that were 
opened after 2006:06, i.e., the month with the first six-monthly listing of bank branches 
within our sample period (4,061 new loans that were originated before this first listing were 
removed). Loans at new branches may have different characteristics, but of course also the 
                                                 
 
12 Islamic loan contracts may (for technical legal reasons) in some cases result in a swifter loss of access for the 
borrower to the financed object (a car, for example) than a conventional loan, but in many instances the 
difference in the timing of the loss of access will be small. 
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characteristics of the borrowers and loan officers there may differ. Unfortunately because of 
multicollinearity we have to drop the borrower fixed effects. 
At new bank branches the hazard of conventional loans is one third (= e-1.119) and the 
hazard of Islamic loans one tenth (= e-2.384) of the hazard of conventional loans at existing 
branches. Yet, at existing branches the hazard of Islamic loans is now three-quarters (= e-0.259) 
of the hazard of conventional loans at existing branches. So it seems that especially new 
Islamic branches attract re-paying borrowers. Alternatively, if the new branches would attract 
worse customers, the loan officers there are aware of the externality of the other banks’ 
screening (Broecker (1990)) and screen themselves more strictly, but then especially so when 
the branch is Islamic and grants Islamic loans. 
In sum, it does not seem to be the case that only differences in loan contract 
characteristics between conventional and Islamic loans can explain their difference in hazard 
rates. 
D. Differences in the Banks that Grant the Conventional and Islamic Loans? 
While we do correct for bank type, our dataset does not include more detailed bank 
characteristics, such as efficiency, capital ratios, overall riskiness of the loan portfolio, and/or 
liability structure, for example. Controlling for (time-invariant) bank fixed effects may be 
important, as default rates may be due to bank-specific clientele effects, risk-taking 
incentives, and/or screening and monitoring technology. 
We therefore include bank fixed effects in a variety of models estimated on the set of 
loans that are issued only by mixed banks that offer both conventional and Islamic loans. This 
reduces our sample to 378,649 loan-month observations (15,653 borrowers for a total of 
109,157 loans). Estimation results are tabulated in Table 7 and the model line-up is similar to 
Table 5. 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Models I and II in Table 7 are comparable to Models III and IV in Table 5, except that 
the estimation results are based on the reduced sample. While the parameter estimates on the 
controls are mostly similar, we find a substantially stronger Islamic loan effect in the reduced 
compared to the full sample. This strong effect remains when we introduce first bank fixed 
effects (and a bank-specific parameter of duration dependence) in Model III, then both 
borrower and bank fixed effects in Model IV, and finally borrower*bank fixed effects in 
Model V. In the latter model the hazard rate on Islamic loans is only one fifth of the hazard 
rate on conventional loans (=e-1.577). Hence the same borrower obtaining conventional and 
Islamic loans from the same bank within the sample period is five times more likely to 
default on the conventional loan(s) than on the Islamic loan(s). 
In Model VI we contrast these mixed borrowers with those having only conventional 
loans from the mixed banks. The latter type of borrowers are three times more likely to 
default on their conventional loans than the mixed type of borrowers on their loans (=e1.184), 
while the mixed and Islamic-only borrowers do not differ on average. 
In sum, these findings combined suggest that at mixed banks the hazard rates increase 
as follows: (1) Islamic loans by mixed borrowers, (2) Islamic loans by Islamic-only 
borrowers, (3) conventional loans by conventional-only borrowers, and (4) conventional 
loans by mixed borrowers. Or put differently, at mixed banks the difference in hazard rates 
between conventional and Islamic loans for mixed borrowers is larger than the difference in 
hazard rates between conventional loans for conventional-only borrowers and the Islamic 
loans for Islamic-only borrowers. 
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Why this wider difference in hazard rates? One possible explanation could reside in the 
penalties banks charge in case of default.13 These penalties flow to the bank in case of non-
performance on a conventional loan yet to a charity (sic) in case of an Islamic loan. In case 
banks would set penalties optimally (but disregarding other loan terms) they may set the 
penalties on conventional loans lower than on Islamic loans, especially for borrowers that 
mix loan types and that are of an intermediate credit quality.14 
Yet, we do not think differential penalties are the explanation here. First, anecdotal 
evidence from supervisors with ample field experience in Pakistan suggests that banks may 
actually set the penalties on conventional and Islamic loans equal to each other. In (online) 
Appendix D we report the penalties we gleaned from bank websites recently for different 
household loan types; while not necessarily equal to those specified on the business loans in 
our study, the penalties the banks list on their website suggest that the penalties on Islamic 
loans may – if anything – even be lower than those on conventional loans. 
Second, when introducing in a variety of specifications the interactions of the Islamic 
loan dummy with – as a proxy for borrower quality – the observed loan rate and the rate 
squared, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant but 
are actually pointing in an opposite direction (i.e., for intermediate loan rate borrowers the 
                                                 
 
13 Borrowers may also maintain other conventional and Islamic bank products (deposits for example) that are 
priced jointly with the conventional and Islamic loans respectively by a separate conventional or Islamic bank 
desk. Any cross-selling across products taken by borrowers or any cross-subsidization across borrowers done at 
the bank level is absorbed by the borrower*bank fixed effects however. Hence, while interesting per se different 
funding costs due to different deposit contracting, other variations in product mixes, different bank organization 
and objectives etc. at these banks cannot be the sole explanation for our findings. 
14 In this way banks would entice non-performance on conventional loans and not only capture the penalties 
(when paid) on the non-performing conventional loan(s), but also assure continued payment of the higher loan 
rates on the Islamic loan(s). This penalties strategy may be optimal for borrowers of an intermediate quality, 
who with a probability between zero and one pay the penalties and repay both loans. For really bad or really 
good mixed borrowers differentiating penalties between conventional and Islamic loans may be marginally less 
important. Of course, ex ante banks likely set penalties jointly with the interest (mark-up) rate and other loan 
terms and/or could provide for example repayment boni. 
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difference in the hazard rate between conventional and Islamic loan is minimal not maximal 
as we would expect if penalties are set optimally). 
E. Borrower, Bank or Loan Characteristics? Or Religion? 
Until now, we have found consistent evidence that the same borrower is less likely to 
default on Islamic than on conventional loans obtained from the same bank, and that when 
borrowing from a mixed bank the difference in hazard rates between conventional and 
Islamic loans for these mixed borrowers is larger than the difference in hazard rates between 
conventional loans for conventional-only borrowers and the Islamic loans for Islamic-only 
borrowers. 
One possible explanation for these robust findings is that borrowers may choose not to 
default on Islamic loans because of their individual religious beliefs. As discussed in the 
aforementioned Box 1, the motivation to take the Islamic loan may also discourage the 
borrower from defaulting on it. Alternatively, to the extent that local piousness affects local 
culture, even relatively less pious borrowers may tend to default less in areas of high religious 
fervency. 
As a first test, in Model VII in Table 7 two variables are introduced that capture 
whether borrowers (that have both type of loans) during the sample period switch to Islamic 
or to conventional borrowing, i.e., whether during the sample period conventional loans were 
obtained first or later than Islamic loans. Those borrowers that switch to Islamic borrowing 
may be, given the recency of their decision, even more motivated not to default on their 
Islamic loans. 
For this exercise the start of the sample period presents a severe left-censoring problem, 
i.e., we cannot observe those loans that are no longer outstanding. One additional caveat 
when interpreting the estimates is that the tighter right-censoring for loans that are recently 
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granted may bias the estimated hazard for new loans downward if duration dependence is 
convex. Hence one has to compare the difference between the two switching coefficients. 
Though not statistically different, the estimates suggest that individual motivation may play a 
role. Those borrowers that only recently turned to Islamic loans are even less likely to default 
on their Islamic loans than those that switched to conventional loans. 
While the most fervent religious believers may prefer to obtain Islamic loans only, 
intermediate fervency may result in mixed borrowing.15 Hit by a negative shock large enough 
to overwhelm their religious resistance to loan default, Islamic-only borrowers have no 
choice but to default on one of their Islamic loans. On the other hand mixed borrowers do 
have a choice and despite their lower fervency may on the margin more often decide not to 
default on their Islamic loans than on their conventional loans. In sum, we think this evidence 
collected so far is inconsistent with the first part of our third hypothesis (H.3) which states 
that for more personally pious borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are equally likely to 
default. 
However, to establish beyond any doubt that religious beliefs matter for loan default 
one would need an objective measurement of religiosity for each individual borrower. As far 
as we are aware no existing research has had access to such a measure,16 and neither do we. In 
                                                 
 
15 We do not think that intermediate piousness and mixed borrowing per se negates religion as a possible 
determinant of lower Islamic loan default (“some people pray but do not fast”). Of course mixed borrowing may 
also arise from specific credit needs such as corporate credit cards, export finance supported by the SBP, 
specific discounting of bills, etc.. Many Islamic scholars would even argue that borrowing at some interest is 
allowed if the borrower is dealing with hardship and needs to obtain life’s necessities such as food and shelter. 
16 Al-Azzam, Hill and Sarangi (2012) find that the repayment delay on 160 group loans in Jordan is negatively 
affected by the percentage of group members who pray five times a day. More broadly Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2013) document that homeowners that find it “morally wrong to walk away” are less likely to say that 
they are willing to default when the value of their home equity falls below a certain threshold even if they can 
afford to pay the monthly mortgage costs. 
29 
 
Table 8 we therefore introduce a number of specifications that take further steps in 
identifying how religion may matter for loan default in this setting. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Model I in Table 8 introduces a variable Ramadan that equals one if the month is in the 
Ramadan period and equals zero otherwise.17 If either (1) the local network effect of religious 
activity, and/or (2) the identification of the borrower with Islamic tenets, plays a role in 
explaining the lower hazard rate on Islamic loans, one would expect this differential between 
conventional and Islamic loans to widen during the holy Muslim month.18 The estimated 
coefficient on the interaction between Islamic loan and Ramadan is indeed negative and 
sizeable, i.e., -0.696*, implying that during Ramadan months default on Islamic loans drops 
by more than half (=e-0.696). 
In case the network effect of religious activity plays a role, the location of the borrower 
(and/or the bank) may matter. In rural areas (and small towns) there may be more inherent 
social pressure to repay and more informal help from family and friends in case a borrower 
faces financial difficulties, and religious affiliation and practice may provide few or no extra 
network benefits. The distinction between religious and other political parties in rural areas 
                                                 
 
17 During the sample period Ramadan took place from September 23rd, 2006, to October 22nd, 2006, from 
September 13th, 2007, to October 12th 2007, and from September 1st, 2008, to October 1st, 2008. In 2006 and 
2007 we consider September and October Ramadan months, in 2008 only September. Given this partial overlap 
in months we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of a seasonal effect, but it would have to affect 
conventional and Islamic loans differentially to explain our findings. 
18 Ramadan is a fundamentally shared experience, both within the local community and with other Muslims 
across the world, and may hence result in both a (temporary) strengthening of local social networks and a surge 
in the identification with the Muslim world and its practices. Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer (2009) show 
that identification with the global Muslim community may also strengthen following participation in the Hajj, 
but we lack individual Hajj participation data to test this conjecture in this context. Following Frieder and 
Subrahmanyam (2004), Bialkowski, Etebari and Wisniewski (2010) show that equity returns in 14 Muslim 
markets are substantially higher during Ramadan, while volatility is markedly lower (see also Bialkowski, Bohl, 
Kaufmann and Wisniewski (2013)). These findings can possibly be attributed to the sentiment of Islamic 
investors and their trades during this period. 
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and small towns may also be less acute than in big cities because rural dwellers may in 
general be more religious. 
We introduce a dummy variable Big City that equals one if borrower is located in a city 
with more than one million inhabitants and equals zero otherwise. To measure local religious 
fervency we rely on a variable Share Religious Political Parties, which equals the percentage 
of total votes obtained for National Assembly seats by the coalition of six religious-political 
parties in the General Elections of 2002 in the district where the borrower is located.19 
We interact the Share variable with the Big City dummy. We expect that if the network 
effects of religion matter the hazard differential between Islamic and conventional loans will 
increase in the share of religious political parties in big cities (i.e., we expect the estimated 
coefficient on Islamic Loan * Share * Big City to be negative).20 
We report the estimates with the Share of Religious Political Parties and Big City 
variables in Models II and III in Table 8. Notice that the sample now includes only those 
loans that are granted in the four provinces and the federal capital (i.e., regions where 
Pakistani political parties can operate) and exclude loans in other regions administered by 
Pakistan. The results are very interesting. The estimated coefficients in Model III (which 
includes bank fixed effects) for example suggest that in big cities: (1) the loan hazard rate is 
on average almost 50 percent higher than in rural areas (i.e., the coefficient on Big City 
equals 0.486***); (2) Islamic loans are relatively more likely to default than in rural areas 
(i.e., the coefficient on Islamic Loan * Big City equals 0.206, hence is positive and sizeable 
                                                 
 
19 We use the poll results from the 2002 General Election because 5 of the 6 religious-political parties boycotted 
the 2008 edition. 
20 Borrower size may also be positively correlated with possible religious network effects. In various 
specifications we indeed find that the coefficient of our measure of borrower size interacted with the Islamic 
Loan dummy is negative, statistically significant, and economically sizable. 
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though not significant); and (3) Islamic loans are relatively less likely to default loans if the 
share of religious parties grows while this is not the case in rural areas (i.e., the coefficient on 
Islamic Loan * Share * Big City equals -0.170***, while the coefficient on Islamic Loan * 
Share equals 0.0429). 
This evidence suggests that difference in loan performance of conventional and Islamic 
loans, especially among urban dwellers that in general may be less pious, may be explained 
by the network effect of religious activity. Hence, this evidence refutes the second part of our 
third hypothesis (H.3) which states that for more religiously networked borrowers, ceteris 
paribus, Islamic loans are equally likely to default. 
In robustness we replace the Share of Religious Political Parties with Religious School 
Enrollment we glean from Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and Zajonc (2006). They define this 
variable as the number of children enrolled in religious schools as a percentage of total school 
enrollments in each district (we use the mid-points for the ranges they report). Results (we do 
not tabulate) again suggest that network effects of religion play a role in determining the 
differential probability of conventional and Islamic loan repayment, though now the effect is 
more muted in big cities than in rural areas. Possibly the increased possibilities for pupils to 
commute in big cities may weaken the correspondence between this measure of local 
religiosity and the differential in hazard rates. 
In a recent study, Pepinsky (2010) argues that the demand for Islamic banking products 
is determined more by a quest by individuals to claim or maintain a Muslim identify, rather 
than by religiosity itself. The need for identification tends to be stronger for middle-class 
borrowers, who are more vulnerable to social dislocation problems induced by modernization 
and globalization, especially when located in a big city. We hypothesize that in particular 
these middle-class borrowers that look to strengthen their Muslim identify not only demand 
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more Islamic banking products but also have a lower propensity to default on them, 
especially in big cities. 
To test this conjecture, we introduce a variable Share of Post-Natal Private Care which 
equals the percentage of women that used private (and not public) hospitals or clinics for 
their post-natal care in the district of the borrower captures the local consumption of a luxury 
good by the middle class. Models IV and V feature this new Share variable and its 
interactions. The estimated coefficient on the triple interaction term (almost marginally 
significant, its p-value equals 0.104) suggests that in big cities Islamic loans are less likely to 
default than conventional loans if the share of post-natal private care grows. 
In sum, the reported estimated correlations suggest that in addition to borrower, loan 
and/or bank loan characteristics, also religion may play some role in determining the 
differential repayment performance of conventional and Islamic loans, through individual 
piousness, network effects and maybe also group identification. 
IV. Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive monthly dataset from Pakistan that follows more than 150,000 
loans over the period 2006:04 to 2008:12, we find compelling evidence that (1) Islamic loans 
are less likely to default than conventional ones, that (2) the same borrower that has both 
types of loans is less likely to default on the Islamic loan, and (3) that default propensities are 
lower for individually pious or religiously networked borrowers. The effects we find are not 
only statistically significant but also large in economic terms: The hazard rate on Islamic 
loans is less than half the hazard rate on conventional loans, across many duration models 
that include a variety of loan contract, borrower, and bank characteristics, where possible 
combined with time, borrower, bank and/or borrower*bank fixed effects. Similarly, the same 
borrower obtaining conventional and Islamic loans from the same bank is five times more 
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likely to default on the conventional loan(s) than on the Islamic one(s). Consistent with our 
third hypothesis, we find that defaults are less likely during Ramadan and in big cities where 
religious parties poll well. 
Our paper establishes a link between religiosity and default rates, contributing to a 
wider literature on the impact of religion on economic outcomes. The co-existence of Islamic 
and conventional loans (banks) offers a unique opportunity to investigate this link, something 
that would be much harder to do for other religions where no religion-based financial 
products exist, at least not on the same scale. Of course, one should be careful in transferring 
our results towards other religions or value systems, and possibly even to other countries with 
different regulation and/or banking landscape. 
It is important to notice that our study does not aim to address the broader question if 
conventional or Islamic finance is “better” from either the borrower’s, bank’s or even 
society’s perspective. Such individual, institutional and public welfare analyses would require 
for example the collection of detailed data on individual motivations for loan repayment and 
the aggregation at the bank level of micro-level data, not only on individual bank loans but 
also on deposits and other bank products, bank organization and processes, among other 
dimensions. 
Our results should also not be interpreted as evidence in favor of a top-down “imposed” 
Islamic banking system. We belief that the voluntary nature of the current mixed banking 
system in Pakistan, where candidate borrowers can self-select in either type of borrowing, is 
key to our understanding of the differential default rates. Imposing Islamic lending across the 
board would likely change the nature of the game completely (à la “Lucas Critique”). 
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Box 1: Religiosity and Loan Default 
 
 
Based on (the notation in) Figure 1 the default probabilities of the granted Islamic and conventional loans, i.e., ݌௜ and ݌௖, equal respectively: 
 
 
We now make a number of straightforward assumptions based on the fundamental nature of Islamic banking that were 
outlined in the main text (for simplicity we denote Islamic banks and Islamic branches of mixed banks as Islamic 
financiers for now but differentiate again later). 
 
Assumption 1: A Muslim applicant is more likely to apply for a loan from an Islamic financier than a secular applicant 
is (notice that it is possible also for secular applicants to apply for an obtain Islamic loans, i.e., ݕ ൒ 0). 
ݔ ൌ ߙݕ, with ଵ௬ ൒ ߙ ൐ 1 
 
Assumption 2: An Islamic financier is more likely to accept an application (which is de iure is always for an Islamic 
loan) from a Muslim applicant than from a secular applicant. 
ܽ ൌ ߚܿ, with ଵ௖ ൒ ߚ ൐ 1 
 
Assumption 3: An Islamic financier is more (less) likely to accept an application (which de iure is always for an 
Islamic loan) from a Muslim (secular) applicant than a conventional financier is. 
ܽ ൌ ߛܾ, with ଵ௕ ൒ ߛ ൐ 1 
݀ ൌ ߜܿ, with ଵ௖ ൒ ߜ ൐ 1 
 
Assumption 4: Given a similar loan, a Muslim borrower is less likely to default on a loan than a secular borrower: 
݉ ൌ ߠ݇, with ଵ௞ ൒ ߠ ൐ 1 
݊ ൌ ߠ݈, with ଵ௟ ൒ ߠ ൐ 1 
 
Assumption 5: A Muslim borrower is less likely to default on an Islamic loan than on a conventional loan: 
݈ ൌ ߤ݇, with ଵ௞ ൒ ߤ ൐ 1 
So that ݊ ൌ ߜߤ݇ 
 
Given these assumptions, the default probabilities of the granted Islamic and conventional loans equal: 
 
 
 
When all borrowers are secular (ݎ ൌ 0) the probabilities equal ݌௜ ൌ ݇ߠ and ݌௖ ൌ ݇ߤߠ, and ݌௖ ൐ ݌௜  and ݌௖ െ ݌௜ ൌ݇ߠሺߤ െ 1ሻ ൐ 0. When all borrowers are Muslim (ݎ ൌ 1) the probabilities equal ݌௜ ൌ ݇ and ݌௖ ൌ ݇ߤ, and again ݌௖ ൐ ݌௜ 
and ݌௖ െ ݌௜ ൌ ݇ሺߤ െ 1ሻ ൐ 0. 
 
Given how increases in ݎ proportionally decreases the differential default probabilities by a factor ߠ, and given that 
analytically it can be shown that  ఋ௣೔ఋ௥ ൏ 0 and  
ఋమ௣೔
ఋ௥మ ൐ 0, and after extensive simulations for many parameter values of 
both default probability schedules, we conclude that for all ݎ: ݌௖ ൐ ݌௜.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Across all borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are less likely to default than conventional loans. 
 
Notice that Islamic loans granted by Islamic branches of mixed banks could be considered more similar to conventional 
loans granted by conventional banks. When such loans would be considered perfect substitutes, i.e., when: 
ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ ߛ ൌ ߜ ൌ ߤ ൌ 1,
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Hypothesis 1.1. If Islamic loans from Islamic banks are considered to be more in accordance with religious tenets than 
Islamic loans from Islamic branches then loans from Islamic banks are even less likely to default than Islamic loans 
from Islamic branches. 
 
Notice that one alternative reading of the model tree is that we are dealing with the same borrower who is in-between 
being a Muslim and a secular person. In the case of multiple granted loans such a person would have been applying for 
(and then servicing) the loan with a probability ݎ as a Muslim and with a probability 1 െ ݎ as a secular person. In that 
case multiple loans in the portfolio of this borrower may have a different type and will have a difference in default 
probability according to their type and in what mode the person is acting. But as before, as Islamic financiers are more 
likely to accept the loan application if the borrower acts as a Muslim, the default rates on the granted Islamic loans will 
be lower on average than the default rates on the conventional loans. 
 
Hypothesis 2. For the same borrower, an Islamic loan taken is less likely to default than a conventional loan taken. 
 
While it is possible that there are Islamic loans in a person’s portfolio that would be taken when this person was acting 
as a secular person, that possibility decreases in likelihood as a person acts more and more as a Muslim. Therefore if a 
person is personally very pious or religiously networked (ݎ → 1) then it is simple to show that a majority of the Islamic 
loans taken by this person will be while acting as a Muslim and that their default probability will be commensurately 
lower. 
 
Hypothesis 3. For more personally pious or religiously networked borrowers, ceteris paribus, Islamic loans are less 
likely to default. 
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Figure 2. 
The figure displays the cumulative hazard based on the estimated coefficients of Model VIII 
in Table 5 for a one-year (median) conventional or Islamic loan with all other covariates set 
at their mean. The cumulative hazard after 12 months (i.e., the vertical line at t=12) for a 
conventional loan equals 5.2 percent, for an Islamic loan it equals 3.1 percent. 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. 
The table summarizes selected empirical work on Islamic banking. 
Paper  Sample    Analysis  
 Countries Period # Obs.  At Level Explains Finds (w.r.t. differences between 
conventional and Islamic banks / loans) 
Imam and Kpodar (2010) 117 1992-2006 1,520  Country - Year Presence Identifies various factors of diffusion 
Mohamad, Hassan and Bader 
(2008), Bader, Mohamad, Ariff 
and Hassan (2008) 
21 1990-2005 80  Bank Efficiency No differences 
Chong and Liu (2009) Malaysia 1995:04-2004:04 109  Month Average interest 
rates 
Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but 
are closely pegged to conventional 
deposits 
Čihák and Hesse (2010) 18 1993-2004 2,347  Bank - Year Z-score 
Bank strength 
 
Small Islamic > small commercial 
Large commercial > large Islamic 
Small Islamic > large Islamic 
Abdul-Majid, Saal and Battisti 
(2010) 
10 1996-2002   Bank - Year Technical 
inefficiency 
Islamic banks are more technically 
inefficient 
Pepinsky (2010) Indonesia 2008:05/06 2,548  Consumers Views on Islamic 
Finance 
Islamic identity matters, not piety 
Weill (2011) 17 2000-2007 1,301  Bank - Year Bank market 
power (Lerner) 
Islamic banks have somewhat less market 
power 
Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü 
(2011) 
Turkey 2008 16,056  Bank - Firm Firm bank choice Islamic banks deal with young, multiple-
bank, industry-focused and transparent 
firms 
Ghannouci, Fiordelisi, 
Molyneux and Radić (2012) 
 2000-2006 1,505 banks  Bank - Year Technology No technology differences (same cost 
efficiency) 
Weill and Godlewski (2012) 6 2001-2009 231 loans  Loans Islamic Choice for Islamic versus conventional 
syndicated loans by large firms driven by 
country-level religiosity and institutional 
quality, not firm-level quality 
Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi 
(2013) 
24 1999-2009 553 banks  Bank - Year Loan risk, bank 
stability 
Small Islamic banks that are leveraged or 
based in countries with predominantly 
Muslim populations have lower credit 
risk than conventional banks. Small 
Islamic banks also appear more stable 
  
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Merrouche (2013) 
22 1995-2009 510 banks  Bank - Year Various bank 
measures 
Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but 
have a higher intermediation ratio, higher 
asset quality and are better capitalized, 
also during the crisis 
Pappas, Izzeldin, Fuertes and 
Ongena (2013) 
20 1995-2010 421 banks  Bank - Year Survival Islamic banks survive longer 
Khan and Khanna (2012) Pakistan 2008 9,078  Customers at two 
banks 
Opening bank 
account 
Religiosity and wealth matters when 
opening an Islamic bank account 
Khan (2010a) Pakistan 2006:06-2009:03 995  Bank - Account Growth deposit 
accounts 
Islamic deposit accounts grow faster than 
conventional ones 
Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer 
(2013) 
Pakistan 2002:02-2010:08 1,696  Bank (Branch) - 
Quarter 
Asset quality, 
stability 
Islamic bank > conventional bank 
Islamic branch > conventional branch of 
the same bank (except when small) 
Zaheer, Ongena and van 
Wijnbergen (2013) 
Pakistan 2002:II-2010:I 756  Bank - Quarter Credit growth Credit channel of monetary policy 
through the Islamic banking sector is less 
potent than through the conventional part 
This paper Pakistan 2006:04-2008:12 603,677  Loan - Month Loan default Islamic loans less likely to default 
 
  
Variable Number of Observations Unit
All new loans granted 1,238,574                             loan - months
Minus  loans to non-corporates 363,221                              loan - months
Minus  micro, special and non-bank loans 252,047                              loan - months
Sample loans observed each month 603,677                                loan - months
Conventional 571,478                             loan - months
Islamic 32,199                               loan - months
Loans 152,730                              loans
Borrowers 22,723                                borrowers
Banks                                          40 banks
PKR = Pakistani Rupee. 1 USD ~ 79 PKR , 1 EUR ~ 110 PKR (December 31, 2008).
The table reports the composition of the sample. The sample period runs from 2006:04 to
2008:12. Loans to non-corporates include loans to financial intermediaries, public sector
enterprises, local, provincial or federal governments, and other autonomous bodies. Micro,
special and non-bank loans comprise loans smaller than PKR 50,000, loans larger than
PKR 419,000,000, infrastructure and other special loans, and loans granted by financial
institutions that are not registered as banks.
Table 2: Sample Composition
Loans observed each month Granted by banks that offer loans that are
only conventional conventional and Islamic only Islamic Totals
only conventional 172,120                   331,675                   - 503,795          
Obtained by borrowers with 
loans that are
conventional and 
Islamic 37,755                     44,946                     8,307                       91,008            
only Islamic - 2,028                       6,846                       8,874              
Totals 209,875                  378,649                  15,153                    603,677          
The table reports the number of loan - months for the samples of borrowers and banks by loan type.
Table 3: Samples for borrowers and banks by loan types
Variable Definition Unit
Islamic Loan =1 if loan is an Islamic loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 32,199 0.053    0.225         0 0 1
by Islamic Branch/Subsidiary =1 if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or 
subsidiary of a conventional bank, =0 otherwise
0/1 17,046 0.028    0.166        0 0 1
by Islamic Bank =1 if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic bank, =0 
otherwise
0/1 15,153 0.025    0.156        0 0 1
Murabahah =1 if Islamic loan is a Murabahah loan, =0 otherwise 0/1 13,869 0.023    0.150        0 0 1
Diminishing Musharakah =1 if Islamic loan is a Diminishing Musharakah loan, =0 
otherwise
0/1 7,219 0.012    0.109        0 0 1
Ijarah or Ijarah wa’ Iqtina =1 if Islamic loan is a Ijarah or Ijarah wa’ Iqtina loan, =0 
otherwise
0/1 7,794 0.013    0.113        0 0 1
Other =1 if Islamic loan is an other Islamic loan type, =0 otherwise 0/1 3,317 0.005    0.074        0 0 1
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Conventional and Islamic Loans
The table reports the name, definition, and unit for all variables employed in the empirical analysis, and the number of observations, mean (and difference-in-means), standard deviation, median, minimum, and maximum seperately for
conventional and Islamic loans (and where indicated for Islamic loans granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a conventional bank or by an Islamic bank ). Other Islamic loan types include Istisna, Salam, Musharakah, Modaraba,
and Qard-e-Hasna loans. The sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. See the Appendix for the Regions, Industries and Bank types.
Number Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Variable Definition Unit
Convent. Islamic Convent. Islamic Convent. Islamic Convent. Islamic Convent. Islamic Convent. Islamic
Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan
(Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank ) (Bank )
Loan Performance
Loan Default =1 if the loan defaults in a certain month, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.009 0.005 *** 0.092 0.068 0 0 0 0 1 1
if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a 
conventional bank (Convent.) or by an Islamic bank (Islamic)
0/1 17,046 15,153 0.007 0.002 0.083 0.045 0 0 0 0 1 1
Duration time to repayment, default or end of sample period months 571,478 32,199 4.958 4.906 ** 4.541 4.473 3 3 1 1 33 32
if the Islamic loan is granted by an Islamic branch or subsidiary of a 
conventional bank (Convent.) or by an Islamic bank (Islamic)
months 17,046 15,153 4.626 5.221 4.159 4.783 3 4 1 1 30 32
Borrower Characteristics
Size the sum of all loans granted by all financial institutions to a 
borrower
mln. PKR 571,478 32,199 329.000 433.000 1,220.000 1,160.000 25 52 0 0 80,900 19,100
ln(Size) the natural log of borrower size - 571,478 32,199 16.849 17.618 *** 2.475 2.143 16.816 17.523 10.820 10.820 25.109 23.659
Region location in province or other distinct region 1 of 8 560,822 30,232 1.969 1.972 2 2
Industry affiliation to industry 1 of 68 556,848 29,893 31.446 31.814 36 34
Loan Characteristics
Maturity period for which loan is granted months 571,478 32,199 15 18 *** 14 20 12 12 1 1 180 236
Collateral =1 if loan is collateralized, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.929 0.991 *** 0.257 0.096 1 1 0 0 1 1
Cash =1 if loan involves immediate cash disbursal, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.739 0.817 *** 0.439 0.387 1 1 0 0 1 1
Export =1 if loan is used for export, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.106 0.038 *** 0.308 0.192 0 0 0 0 1 1
Agricultural =1 if loan is used for agricultural activities, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.037 0 *** 0.189 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Seniority of Charge =1 if loan taken is the only one outstanding, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.379    0.360    *** 0.485        0.480       0 0 0 0 1 1
Durable =1 if loan is granted for durable/fixed asset, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.142 0.266 *** 0.349 0.442 0 0 0 0 1 1
Interest Rate the interest rate on the loan % 234,398 5,545 12.695 14.795 *** 4.214 2.301 13.50 14.63 1.000 1.000 42.80 42.05
Amount the amount of cash disbursed or the granted limit 000 PKR 571,478 32,199 22,900 34,900 *** 50,400 58,000 4,800 11,400 50 50 419,000 418,000
New Bank Branch =1 if loan is granted by a bank branch opened after 2006:06, =0 o 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.021 0.131 *** 0.142 0.337 0 0 0 0 1 1
Bank Characteristics
Government =1 if bank is government-owned, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.133 0.087 *** 0.340 0.282 0 0 0 0 1 1
Specialized =1 if bank is a specialized bank, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.038 0.000 0.191 0.000 0 0 0 0 1 0
Foreign =1 if bank is foreign-owned, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.018 0.174 *** 0.132 0.379 0 0 0 0 1 1
Large =1 if bank is 1 of the 5 largest by loan volume, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.367 0.055 *** 0.482 0.227 0 0 0 0 1 1
Time Period Characteristic
Ramadan =1 if Ramadan takes place during the month, =0 otherwise 0/1 571,478 32,199 0.132 0.131 0.339 0.337 0 0 0 0 1 1
Borrower District Characteristics
Big City =1 if borrower is located in a city with more than one million 
inhabitants, =0 otherwise
0/1 559,945 30,811 0.651 0.835 *** 0.477 0.371 1 1 0 0 1 1
Share Religious Political Parties percentage of total votes obtained for National Assembly seats 
by the coalition of six religious-political parties in General 
Elections-2002 in the district of the borrower
% 560,454 31,357 13.911 17.378 *** 12.031 12.700 10.235 10.235 0 0 74.107 74.107
Share Private Post-Natal Care percentage of women who used private (and not public) 
hospitals or clinics for post-natal care in the district of the 
borrower
% 560,734 31,424 0.208 0.229 *** 0.118 0.118 0.183 0.183 0 0 0.392    0.392
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tailed. PKR = Pakistani Rupee. 1 USD ~ 79 PKR , 1 EUR ~ 110 PKR (December 31, 2008).
Diff.
Number Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Estimation Logit Dynamic Logit Dynamic Logit Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Cox
Dependent Variable Loan Default 
0/1
Loan-Month 
Default 0/1
Loan-Month 
Default 0/1
Hazard Rate Hazard Rate Hazard Rate Hazard Rate Hazard Rate
Islamic Loan -0.500*** -0.612*** -0.455*** -0.581*** -0.725*** -0.402** -0.508***
(0.148) (0.144) (0.158) (0.144) (0.157) (0.158) (0.193)
 -- by Islamic branch or subsidiary of conventional bank -0.262
(0.189)
 -- by Islamic Bank -0.781***
(0.238)
Borrower Characteristics
ln(Size) 0.0107 -0.00934 0.0148 0.0145
(0.0275) (0.0223) (0.0247) (0.0247)
Loan Characteristics
Maturity 0.00776*** 0.00504** 0.00462* 0.00472** 0.00909***
(0.00228) (0.00222) (0.00238) (0.00238) (0.00138)
Collateral -0.183 -0.233** 0.0462 0.0476 -0.109
(0.127) (0.114) (0.136) (0.136) (0.105)
Cash 2.217*** 2.302*** 2.185*** 2.181*** 1.509***
(0.111) (0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.109)
Export 0.0371 -0.0152 0.00793 0.00947 -0.199***
(0.213) (0.211) (0.204) (0.204) (0.0654)
Agricultural -0.244 -0.701** -0.302 -0.301 0.245
(0.247) (0.318) (0.251) (0.251) (0.381)
Bank Characteristics
Government 0.259** 0.216* 0.213* 0.503***
(0.129) (0.123) (0.123) (0.121)
Specialized -0.110 -0.113 -0.114 0.191
(0.299) (0.305) (0.305) (1.322)
Foreign -0.768** -0.828** -0.745** -0.552
(0.339) (0.339) (0.335) (0.374)
Large 0.763*** 0.719*** 0.718*** 0.575***
(0.164) (0.154) (0.153) (0.0984)
Intercept -3.128*** -4.752*** -7.425*** -4.759*** -6.689*** -8.752*** -8.745***
(0.0620) (0.0608) (0.647) (0.0995) (0.476) (1.169) (1.168)
Borrower Region dummies (7) No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Year*Month Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Fixed Effects No No No No No No No Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood -20,995 -29,115 -26,525 -25,121 -23,013 -22,157 -22,154 -9,510
a (Duration Dependence) - - - 0.978 0.983 0.962 0.962 -
Chi2(k) [LR in VI, VII, IX & XIII, Wald in others] 11 18 1055 16 4,009 4,479 4,437 1,631
Number of regressors minus one (k) 1 1 81 1 81 117 118 42
Number of Loan-Months - 603,677 581,620 603,677 582,759 582,759 582,759 603,677
Number of Loans 122,331 152,730 146,849 152,730 149,302 149,302 149,302 152,730
Number of Borrowers 19,063 22,723 21,848 22,723 21,866 21,866 21,866 22,723
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tailed.
The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of logit and duration models. The dependent variable in Model I equals one if the loan defaults and equals zero
otherwise. The dependent variable in Model II equals one if the loan defaults in a certain month, and equals zero otherwise. The dependent variable in all other models is the
hazard rate. The estimations in Models I and II employ logit models. The estimations in Models III to VI employ parametric duration models with a Weibull distribution that
includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model VII reports the results of a Cox-proportional hazard model and includes borrower fixed effects. The sample period runs
from 2006:04 to 2008:12. For each variable in the specification the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in
parentheses). In all estimations involving parametric models, standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Table 5: All Banks
Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Alteration Only Cash Loans Seniority Added Durable Added Interest Rate Added Loan Amount Added
By Islamic Loan 
Type
Murabahah and 
Similar Conv.
Murabahah and 
Similar Conv. 180-Days Default New Bank Branch
Maturity < 1 Year
Collateral = 1
Islamic Loan -0.535*** -0.509*** -0.498*** -0.406** -0.506*** -0.554* -0.587* -0.740** -0.259*
(0.203) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.298) (-0.352) (0.308) (0.158)
 -- Murabaha -0.445*
(0.240)
 -- Diminishing Musharakah -0.886*
(0.469)
 -- Ijarah -0.558*
(0.310)
 -- Other -0.263
(0.456)
Islamic Loan * New Bank Branch -2.384**
(1.058)
Borrower Characteristics
ln(Size) 0.0181
(0.0247)
Loan Characteristics
Maturity 0.00653*** 0.00907*** 0.00950*** 0.00510* 0.00872*** 0.00924*** 0.00966*** 0.00243 0.0111*** 0.00485**
(0.00150) (0.00138) (0.00142) (0.00305) (0.00138) (0.00140) (0.00208) (0.0156) (0.00190) (0.00233)
Collateral -0.0968 -0.110 -0.110 -0.244 -0.105 -0.111 -0.323** -0.167 -0.0429
(0.115) (0.105) (0.105) (0.157) (0.105) (0.105) (0.158) (0.139) (0.135)
Cash 1.509*** 1.518*** 1.161*** 1.500*** 1.505*** 1.543*** -2.203***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.338) (0.109) (0.109) (0.151) (0.112)
Export -0.207*** -0.199*** -0.204*** 0.156 -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.214*** 0.00234
(0.0662) (0.0654) (0.0654) (0.128) (0.0650) (0.0654) (0.0793) (0.203)
Agricultural 0.267 0.246 0.215 0.385 0.247 0.243 -0.631 -0.300
(0.386) (0.381) (0.382) (0.581) (0.380) (0.381) (0.671) (0.251)
Seniority of Charge 0.0204
(0.0916)
Durable -0.112
(0.0878)
Interest Rate 0.0277**
(0.0116)
Amount 0.001***
(0.0005)
New Bank Branch -1.199***
(0.293)
Table 6: All Banks: Robustness
The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of duration models. Models I to VIII report the results of a Cox-proportional hazard model and include borrower fixed effects. The estimation in Model IX employs a parametric duration model
with a Weibull distribution that includes a parameter of duration dependence. The sample used in Model I contains only cash loans. The sample used in Models VII and VIII contains Murabaha and conventional loans given as working capital and term
finance (excluding all other credit facilities, i.e., mortgage finance, leases, export finance, agricultural finance and off-balance financing). In Model VIII the sample is further restricted to loan that are collateralized and with a maturity shorter than one
year. The sample period used in Model X starts in 2006:07. Otherwise the sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. For each variable in the specification the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical
significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In all estimations involving parametric models, standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Bank Characteristics
Government 0.533*** 0.503*** 0.498*** 0.383 0.442*** 0.504*** 0.561*** 1.414*** 0.202 0.199
(0.125) (0.121) (0.121) (0.279) (0.123) (0.121) (0.186) (0.306) (0.162) (0.123)
Specialized 0.0772 0.187 0.239 0.145 0.191 -0.419 -36.03 -0.138
(1.440) (1.321) (1.343) (1.315) (1.322) (0.443) (38.000) (0.305)
Foreign -0.529 -0.551 -0.558 -0.201 -0.554 -0.507 -0.596 0.189 -0.908***
(0.401) (0.374) (0.374) (0.553) (0.372) (0.379) (0.674) (0.481) (0.339)
Large 0.570*** 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.984*** 0.566*** 0.578*** 0.528*** 0.157 0.774*** 0.694***
(0.102) (0.0983) (0.0984) (0.195) (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.138) (0.205) (0.130) (0.150)
Intercept -8.206***
(1.153)
Borrower Region dummies (7) No No No No No No No No No Yes
Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No No No No No No No No No Yes
Year*Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Log Pseudolikelihood -9,018 -9,510 -9,510 -2,922 -9,506 -9,510 -4,302 -2,632 -5,771 -22,062
a (Duration Dependence) - - - - - - - - - 0.961
Chi2(k) [LR in VI, VII, IX & XIII, Wald in others] 1,215 1,631 1,632 545 1,639 1,632 814 436.0 1,238 7,419
Number of regressors minus one (k) 41 43 43 41 43 45 38 35 42 119
Number of Loan-Months 448,333 603,677 603,677 239,946 603,677 603,677 257,979 172,105 613,218 580,810
Number of Loans 107,476 152,730 152,730 54,952 152,730 152,730 61,184 40,335 152,730 148,669
Number of Borrowers 19,084 22,723 22,723 13,628 21,574 21,574 14,652 12,191 22,041 21,837
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tailed.
I II III IV V VI VII
Islamic Loan -1.601*** -1.869*** -1.654*** -2.015** -1.554* -1.374***
(0.358) (0.384) (0.381) (0.865) (0.928) (0.326)
 -- Borrowers with conventional and Islamic loans 0.196
(0.580)
 -- Borrowers with only conventional loans 1.184***
(0.426)
 -- Borrowers that switch to Islamic loans (from conventional) -0.877*
(0.464)
 -- Borrowers that switch to conventional loans (from Islamic) -0.350
(0.956)
Borrower Characteristics
ln(Size) 0.0147 0.0345 0.0431 0.0429
(0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0302) (0.0304)
Loan Characteristics
Maturity -0.00446 -0.00799* 0.00500* 0.0071*** -0.00807* -0.00804*
(0.00390) (0.00429) (0.00256) (0.00276) (0.00429) (0.00429)
Collateral -0.479*** -0.559*** -0.204* -0.238* -0.551*** -0.552***
(0.137) (0.136) (0.123) (0.127) (0.137) (0.137)
Cash 2.485*** 2.357*** 1.800*** 1.786*** 2.350*** 2.358***
(0.148) (0.160) (0.169) (0.178) (0.159) (0.159)
Export -0.0254 -0.0608 -0.239*** -0.173** -0.0558 -0.0611
(0.255) (0.238) (0.0757) (0.0790) (0.236) (0.237)
Agricultural 0.238 0.0639 0.700 0.523 0.0591 0.0642
(0.193) (0.199) (0.443) (0.444) (0.199) (0.199)
Intercept -4.734*** -6.657*** -6.907*** -8.162*** -7.004***
(0.130) (0.614) (1.224) (1.286) (1.232)
Borrower Region dummies (7) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Borrower Industry Dummies (67) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Year*Month Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Borrower*Bank Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No
Log Pseudolikelihood -17,336 -15,824 -14,695 -6,863 -7031 -14,679 -14,674
a (Duration Dependence) 1.009 1.026 by bank - - by bank by bank
Chi2(k) [LR in VI-X, Wald in other] 20 6,334 7,390 1,280 1019 7,768 7,819
Number of regressors minus one (k) 1 81 123 46 36 124 125
Number of Loan-Months 378,649 372,415 372,415 378,649 378,649   372,415   372,415
Number of Loans 109,157 107,944 107,944 109,157 109,157   107,944   107,944
Number of Borrowers 15,653     15,355     15,355     15,653     15,653     15,355     15,355
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tailed.
Table 7: Mixed Banks
The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of duration models. Models I to III and V to VII employ parametric duration
models with a Weibull distribution that includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model IV reports the results of a Cox-proportional
hazard model and includes borrower fixed effects. The sample includes only loans given by banks that grant both conventional and Islamic
loans and the sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12. The dependent variable is the hazard rate. For each variable in the specification
the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In Models I to III and V
to VII standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Models I II III IV V
Islamic Loan -0.569*** -0.463 -0.859 -2.133** -1.667
(0.191) (0.450) (0.715) (0.925) (1.185)
Islamic Loan * Ramadan -0.696*
(0.363)
Islamic Loan * Share 0.0399** 0.0429 13.13** 9.050
(0.0169) (0.0269) (6.533) (9.136)
Islamic Loan * Big City 0.0108 0.206 0.923 -0.331
(0.511) (0.907) (1.004) (1.360)
Islamic Loan * Share  * Big City -0.0474** -0.170*** -10.830 -10.300
(0.0202) (0.0567) (6.666) (9.384)
Added Variables
Ramadan -0.0481
(0.0600)
Share 0.00588 0.00687 0.324 -0.767
(0.00462) (0.00525) (0.837) (0.870)
Share  * Big City 0.000510 0.00193 -0.268 1.350
(0.00676) (0.00756) (1.021) (1.100)
Loan Characteristics
Maturity 0.0125*** 0.00396* -0.00912** 0.00397* -0.00828**
(0.00133) (0.00238) (0.00418) (0.00239) (0.00417)
Collateral 0.331*** -0.022 -0.593*** -0.0253 0.577***
(0.0990) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.133)
Cash -1.617*** 2.256*** 2.482*** 2.240*** 2.454***
(0.107) (0.113) (0.163) (0.113) (0.162)
Export -0.192*** -0.0536 -0.127 -0.0558 0.113
(0.0620) (0.204) (0.239) (0.205) (0.237)
Agricultural 0.217 -0.173 0.247 -0.177 0.218
(0.368) (0.262) (0.202) (0.265) (0.202)
Borrower Characteristics
ln(Size) 0.0267 0.0462 0.0285 0.0455
(0.0465) (0.0626) (0.0469) (0.0636)
Big City 0.395*** 0.486*** 0.470** 0.367*
(0.126) (0.143) (0.183) (0.198)
Bank Characteristics
Government 0.353*** 0.239* 0.229*
(0.115) (0.124) (0.128)
Specialized -0.505 -0.0259 -0.0512
(1.161) (0.318) (0.314)
Foreign -0.515 -0.855** -0.847**
(0.360) (0.337) (0.337)
Large 0.659*** 0.823*** 0.803***
(0.0967) (0.158) (0.152)
Intercept -7.145*** -5.799*** -7.141*** -6.010***
(1.308) (1.535) (1.308) (1.561)
Region dummies (7) No No No No No
Industry Dummies (67) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Month Fixed Effects d(Quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes No No No No
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood -10,013 -21,928 -14,477 -21932 -14,554
 (Duration Dependence) - 0.971 1.021 0.970 1.045
Chi2(k) [LR in VI, VII, IX & XIII, Wald in others] 625.8 4,179*** 6,268*** 4,166.30*** 6,529.89***
Number of regressors minus one (k) 15 116 122 116 122
Number of Loan-Months 603,677 578,809 369,816 579,144 370,063
Number of Loans 152,730 148,316 107,215 148,397 107,282
Number of Borrowers 22,723 21,574 15,144 21,586 15,153
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, two-tailed.
Table 8: Religion as a Motivator to Perform on Loans
The table reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of duration models. All estimations except in Model I employ parametric
duration models with a Weibull distribution that includes a parameter of duration dependence. Model I reports the results of a Cox-
proportional hazard model and includes quarter dummies and borrower fixed effects. Estimations in Models II to V include only those
loans that are granted in the four provinces and the federal capital (i.e., regions where Pakistani political parties can operate and key
statistics are recorded) and exclude loans in other regions administered by Pakistan. The sample period runs from 2006:04 to 2008:12.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate. For each variable in the specification the table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical
significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In all estimations below involving parametric models, standard errors are
clustered by borrower.
Share  = Religious Political 
Parties
Share  = Post-Natal Private 
Care
APPENDIX -- NOT FOR PUBLICATION
  
Appendix A: Types of Islamic Products 
 
This Appendix aims to provide a brief summary of the main issues in Islamic finance and the dominant types of Islamic products that are 
employed to finance small businesses. For more detail see Kettell (2010) for example. 
Under Islamic economic philosophy, granting a loan is essentially a charitable activity and hence should occur without any compensation. The 
borrower may (and is encouraged to) voluntarily pay back more than the principal amount to show her/his gratitude towards lender, however, it 
is prohibited to make an agreement regarding any such additional payment. 
If someone wants to earn profits from transferring money, then one must make an investment and share both in the risk and the return of the 
venture. The ideal modes of Islamic finance are thus Musharakah (partnership, where all partners invest both money and some or contribute 
their expertise) and Mudarabah (partnership with some partners investing only money and others only their skills/labor). Islamic banks, 
however, have devised a variety of other products that mimic the conventional banking products. Many of these products are based on sale 
contracts rather than loan contracts while others are based on rental contracts. Salient features of most widely used Islamic financial products are 
given below. 
The first column lists the name of the Islamic banking product. The second column mentions the conventional (banking) product(s) that are 
similar to that particular Islamic product. The third column describes the way the product operates, the fourth column defines the default event 
and the last column describes the penalties in case of default. 
 
Islamic Product Conventional 
Equivalent 
Operation Default Penalties in the Event of Default 
Murabahah 
 
Term loan 
(w/ balloon 
payment) 
installment loan 
(w/ bullet 
payments) 
 
1. Murabahah is a kind of sale in which seller 
discloses cost to the buyer. 
 
2. Bank and customer enter into a Murabahah 
agreement  
 
3. The bank appoints the customer as its agent 
to purchase the asset and gives her/him money for 
that or the bank itself purchases the asset  
 
4. Under a separate contract, the bank sells 
that asset to the customer at a marked-up price 
Default occurs when the 
customer misses a 
payment. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more. 
1. The bank cannot change the 
sales price once it is fixed. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of the customer regarding 
delayed payment or non-payment of 
any amount when it is due, the 
customer undertakes that s/he will 
give x% per annum of the overdue 
amount for the period of default to a 
charity fund managed by the bank. 
 
  
5. The customer pays the price in installments 
over a period of time or in lump sum at an agreed 
on date. 
 
Notes: 
Bank can appoint the customer as an agent to 
purchase the underlying asset on its behalf, but 
bank must retain the risk and return as the owner of 
the asset. 
 
Bank must own the asset before it could sell it. 
 
Murabahah cannot be used to finance 
commodities/assets already owned by the 
customer. 
 
Unlike a normal sale, the customer knows the cost 
and profit of the bank. 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover the 
‘real losses’ suffered like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
 
Diminishing 
Musharakah 
 
 
Hire-purchase, 
mortgage 
financing 
1. Customer approaches the bank with a 
request to finance a fixed asset (say building). 
 
2. Bank agrees to a joint ownership with the 
customer and agrees to finance say 80% of the 
value of the building, worth $10M. 
 
3. Bank pays $8M to seller, customer pays 
$2M to seller. 
 
4. The bank divides its ownership in say 20 
parts and the customer undertakes to purchase 
those parts at agreed dates. 
 
5. The customer uses the building and pays 
rent to the bank for its 80% ownership in the 
Default occurs when the 
customer misses a 
payment. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more.  
 
Breach of promise also 
occurs if the customer 
does not keep her/ his 
promise to purchase 
bank’s share in asset. 
1. Bank cannot change the rent 
or sale price of its share in asset once 
it is fixed. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of customer regarding delayed 
payment or non-payment of any 
amount when it is due, the customer 
undertakes that s/he will give x% per 
annum of the overdue amount for the 
period of default to a charity fund 
managed by the bank. 
 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover ‘real 
 building. 
 
6. At agreed dates, the customer purchases 
the bank’s shares in the building, the ownership in 
the building gradually transfers to the customers. 
 
7. The bank’s share in rent of the building 
decreases proportionally. 
 
Notes: 
The contract of joint ownership and the promise to 
purchase the shares in asset from bank cannot be 
made conditional on each other. 
 
The promise to purchase bank’s share is essentially 
a unilateral promise by the customer. 
losses’ suffered by it like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
 
Ijarah 
 
Operating lease 1. It involves the transfer of usufruct but not 
ownership of the asset at an agreed rent. 
 
2. Customer (lessee) approaches the bank 
(lessor) for lease of a specific asset and makes a 
promise to lease that asset. 
 
3. The bank purchases the asset, or it may 
appoint customer to purchase the asset as its agent. 
 
4. After acquisition, the bank rents the asset 
to the customer for a specific rent; rent may vary 
for different periods. 
 
5. The customer pays the rent on agreed 
dates. 
 
Notes: 
Anything, which cannot be used without 
Default occurs when the 
lessee misses a payment. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more.  
 
1. Bank cannot change the rent 
once it is fixed. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of customer regarding delayed 
payment or non-payment of any 
amount when it is due, the customer 
undertakes that s/he will give x% per 
annum of the overdue amount for the 
period of default to a charity fund 
managed by the bank. 
 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover ‘real 
losses’ suffered by it like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
 
 consuming, cannot be leased out, for example 
money, wheat etc. 
 
Bank retains the risks and rewards of the owner.  
 
Customer is responsible for the costs and benefits 
as the user of the asset 
 
The lease agreement can be terminated with the 
mutual consent of lessee and lessor or it can be 
terminated by lessor if the lessee contravenes any 
terms of lease. 
Ijarah wa’ 
Iqtina 
 
 
Financial lease 1. It involves transferring of usufruct of the 
asset, and at the end of lease period ownership of 
the asset also transfers to customer. 
 
2. Customer (lessee) approaches the bank 
(lessor) for the lease of a specific asset and makes a 
promise to lease that asset. 
 
3. The bank purchases the asset, or it may 
appoint customer to purchase the asset as its agent. 
 
4. The bank makes a separate promise to give 
the asset to the lessee at the end of lease period as a 
gift or to sell the asset for a specific price. The 
promise must be unilateral i.e. not binding on 
lessee and it cannot be conditional on the lease 
contract. 
 
5. After acquisition, bank rents the asset to 
the customer for a specific rent; rent may vary for 
different periods. 
 
6. The customer pays the rent on agreed 
Default occurs when the 
lessee misses a payment. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more.  
 
1. Bank cannot change the rent 
or sale price of the asset once it is 
fixed. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of customer regarding delayed 
payment or non-payment of any 
amount when it is due, the customer 
undertakes that s/he will give x% per 
annum of the overdue amount for the 
period of default to a charity fund 
managed by the bank. 
 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover ‘real 
losses’ suffered by it like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
 
 dates. 
 
7. At the end of the Ijarah period, the bank 
sells the asset to the customer or gives it away to 
customer as gift. 
 
Note: 
The contract of Ijarah cannot be conditional on 
signing the promise of sale or gift. The promise 
must be made separately. 
Istisna 
 
In some aspects 
comparable to 
working capital 
finance 
1. Istisna’ is a sales transaction where a 
commodity is traded before it comes into existence. 
It is an order to a manufacturer to manufacture a 
specific commodity for the buyer. 
 
2. The price can be paid in advance, in 
installments or at the time of delivery.  
 
3. The bank and customer enter into an 
Istisna contract, bank orders the customer to 
manufacture specific goods. 
 
4. Bank can pay some or entire sum of the 
order in advance or in installments. 
 
5. Customer manufactures the products and 
delivers them to the bank. The delivery can be 
constructive. 
 
6. Bank appoints the customer (or anyone 
else) as its agent to sell the manufactured goods for 
cash or credit and receives the proceeds. 
 
7. The agent is entitled to agency fees for 
services. 
Default occurs if 
customer fails to deliver 
specified goods in time. 
 
Default also occurs if the 
agent fails to perform 
her duties. 
1. It is permissible for the bank 
and customer to agree that in the 
event of delay in delivery of goods 
the price will be reduced by a 
specific amount per day. 
 
2. It is also permissible to 
change the price later because of 
force majeure. 
  
Note: 
The customer can utilize the amount paid by bank 
for any purpose. 
Salam 
 
 1. In Salam, the seller undertakes to supply 
specific goods to the buyer at a future date in 
exchange of a price fully paid in advance. 
 
2. Bank enters in a Salam contract with 
customer and pays the price for goods to be 
delivered at a later date. 
 
3. With the same delivery date bank enters 
into a parallel Salam with another customer to sell 
the goods that it expects to receive under the first 
Salam contract. 
 
4. Alternatively bank can obtain a promise 
from another potential buyer of the goods that the 
bank expects to receive under Salam. The bank can 
then sell the products for cash when it receives 
them. 
 
5. The price under two Salam contracts or the 
first Salam and purchase promise can be different 
and that difference is profit of the bank. 
 
Notes: 
Engineering a buyback agreement using parallel 
Salam is not permissible, i.e., the seller under first 
Salam cannot be buyer under the second Salam 
contract 
 
The two Salam contract are distinct from each 
other and cannot be made conditional on one 
Default occurs, if the 
customer fails to 
perform her obligations 
under the contract. 
 
Any misrepresentation 
by the customer is also 
construed as an event of 
default. 
 
 another. 
 
Bank can ask for security or guarantee to ensure 
performance on part of its customer 
Musharakah 
 
Joint venture 1. Musharakah is a relationship between two 
parties or more, who contribute capital to a 
business, and divide the net profit and loss. All 
providers of capital are entitled to participate in 
management, but not necessarily required to do so. 
The profit is distributed among the partners in pre-
agreed ratios, while the loss is borne by each 
partner strictly in proportion to respective capital 
contributions. 
 
2. Bank and customer enter into a Musharaka 
agreement by investing a certain sum of capital in 
the business for a specified period of time. 
 
3. Bank and customer also define the share of 
each party in expected profits. The customer also 
gives an (annual) projection of profit. 
 
4. The customer periodically (monthly/ 
quarterly) pays the profit to the bank based on the 
profit projections and bank’s share in profit. 
 
5. These profit payments are provisional and 
are subject to upward or downward adjustments 
based on the realized profits/losses. 
 
6. At the end of Musharaka contract, 
customer pays back the capital of the bank net of 
profits/losses.  
 
Notes: 
Default occurs if the 
customer fails to make 
profit or capital 
payments when they are 
due. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more.  
 
1. If the business suffers losses, 
then bank assumes the losses in 
proportion to its investment. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of customer regarding delayed 
payment or non-payment of any 
amount when it is due, the customer 
undertakes that s/he will give x% per 
annum of the overdue amount for the 
period of default to a charity fund 
managed by the bank. 
 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover ‘real 
losses’ suffered by it like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
 
 
 
 Return can be fixed as a percentage of profit but 
not as a percentage of investment. 
 
Share of an active partner in profit can be more 
than her/his contribution to capital. A sleeping 
partner cannot share in profit more than her/his 
share is capital. 
 
Loss is always shared proportional to the invested 
capital. 
Mudaraba 
 
Similar to hedge 
/ mutual funds 
1. Mudaraba is a kind of partnership between 
two parties, where one party (or parties-financiers) 
provides finances and the other (entrepreneur) 
provides expertise, labor and management. Profits 
made are shared between the financier and the 
entrepreneur according to a predetermined ratio. In 
the event of loss, the financier absorbs all losses, 
while the entrepreneur loses her/his provision of 
labor 
 
2. Bank and customer enter into a Mudaraba 
agreement, whereby the bank invests all the 
required capital and the customer commits his 
skills/management. 
 
3. Bank and customer also define their shares 
in expected profits. 
 
4. The customer periodically (monthly/ 
quarterly) pays the profit to the bank as agreed 
between the two. 
 
5. At the end of Mudaraba contract, the 
Mudaraba can be dissolved or extended. In case of 
dissolution, the customer pays back the principal 
Default occurs if the 
customer fails to make 
payments to the bank 
when they become due 
under the agreement or 
when customer fails to 
render her/his duties as 
agent of the bank to 
manage the affairs of the 
business. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more. 
 
1. If the customer (agent) acts 
negligently to run the affairs of the 
business and business suffers loss 
because of negligence then bank can 
deny payment of compensation(for 
management and labor) to the 
customer. 
 
2. The bank can also take over 
the business and terminate the right 
of the customer to look after it if the 
customer contravenes any terms of 
Mudaraba agreement. 
 
3. The customer is liable for the 
loss if it is proven that s/he has 
breached her/his obligations. 
 net of any accrued profits or losses. 
Notes: 
Return can be fixed as a percentage of profit but 
not as a percentage of investment. 
 
Losses are always absorbed by the 
financier(s)/bank. 
Qard-e-Hasna 
 
 
Benevolent 
Loan 
1. The borrower approaches the bank for 
financing. 
 
2. The bank agrees to give loan to customer 
for a certain period, to be paid back in installments 
or in one go. 
 
3. Bank can charge service fee, and 
documentation charges. 
 
4. Bank cannot claim any other interest or 
profits for time value of money. 
Default occurs when the 
customer fails to pay an 
amount when it is due. 
 
The facility is classified 
as non-performing when 
a payment is overdue by 
90 days or more. 
1. Bank cannot any additional 
amount in the event of default by the 
borrower. 
 
2. To contain moral hazard on 
part of customer regarding delayed 
payment or non-payment of any 
amount when it is due, the customer 
undertakes that s/he will give x% per 
annum of the overdue amount for the 
period of default to a charity fund 
managed by the bank. 
 
3. Bank can approach a court to 
seek redressal, court may award 
solatium to the bank to cover ‘real 
losses’ suffered by it like the cost of 
litigation. Real losses do not include 
time value of money. 
Appendix B: Banks
The appendix reports the banks by type (and which therefore may appear in more
than one category).
Banks
Islamic Banks
Albaraka Islamic Bank B.S.C. (E.C.)
Meezan Bank Ltd.
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Ltd.
BankIslami Pakistan Limited
Emirates Global Islamic Bank
Dawood Islamic Bank Ltd.
Government Banks
The Bank of Khyber
The Bank of Punjab
First Women Bank Limited
National Bank of Pakistan
Specialized Banks
IDPB (industrial development)
Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.
SME Bank
ZTBL (agricultural development)
Foreign Banks
Albaraka Islamic Bank B.S.C. (E.C.)
Barclays Bank Plc
Citi Bank N.A.
Deutsche Bank A.G.
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
Oman International Bank S.A.O.G.
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd.
Large Banks
Bank Alfalah Limited
Habib Bank Limited
MCB Bannk Limited
National Bank of Pakistan
United Bank Limited
Banks with Both Islamic and Conventional Loans
Askari Commercial Bank Limited
Bank Alfalah Limited
Bank Al-Habib Limited
Bank of Khyber
Habib Bank Limited
Habib-Metropolital Bank Limited
MCB Bannk Limited
National Bank of Pakistan
Royal Bank of Scotland (Formerly ABN Amro Bank NV)
Soneri Bank Limited
Standard Chartered Bank Limited
United Bank Limited
All Other Banks (Smaller Private Domestic Banks Offering only Conventional Loans)
Allied Bank  Limited
Arif Habib Rupali Bank Limited
Atlas  Bank Limited
Crescent Commercial Bank Limited
Faysal Bank Limited
JS Bank Limited
KASB Bank Limited
Mybank Limited
NIB Bank Ltd
Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Limited
Soneri Bank Limited
Appendix C: Regions and Industries
Regions
Province of Punjab
Province of Sindh
North-Western Frontier Province (renamed as Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa in 2010)
Province of Baluchistan
Federal Capital Area
(Pakistan Administered) Azad Kashmir
Federally Administered Tribal Area
Federally Administered Northern Area (Gilgit Baltistan as of 29 August 2009)
Industries (Sectors)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry - Others
Commerce and Trade- Retail trade
Commerce and Trade- Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles
Commerce and Trade- Wholesales and commission trade
Construction- Buildings
Construction- Infrastructure
Education
Electricity, gas and water supply
Fishing, farming, aquaculture and related service activities
Foreign constituents
Health and social work
Hotels, restaurants and clubs
Insurance 
Manufacturing- Basic metals
Manufacturing- Chemicals and chemical products
Manufacturing- Electrical machinery and apparatus
Manufacturing- Fabricated metal products
Manufacturing- Furniture and fixture
Manufacturing- Handicrafts
Manufacturing- Jewellery and related articles
Manufacturing- Machinery and equipments
Manufacturing- Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
Manufacturing- Motor vehicles, trailers and semi - trailers
Manufacturing- Office, accounting and computing machinery
Manufacturing- Other sectors
Manufacturing- Other non - metallic mineral products
Manufacturing- Other transport equipment
Manufacturing- Petroleum products
Manufacturing- Radio, television and communication equipments and apparatus
Manufacturing- Rubber and plastic products
Manufacturing- Sport goods
Manufacturing- Food products
Manufacturing- Papers, paper boards and products
Manufacturing- Printing, publishing and allied industries
Manufacturing- Tanning and dressing of leather
Manufacturing- Textiles- Weaving
Manufacturing- Textiles- Spinning
Manufacturing- Textiles- Finishing
Manufacturing- Textiles- Made-up
Manufacturing- Textiles- Knitwear
Manufacturing- Textiles- Carpets and rugs
Manufacturing- Textiles- Wearing apparel, ready made garments and dressing
Manufacturing- Textiles- Other
Manufacturing- Tobacco
Manufacturing- Wood products
Mining and quarrying
Other community, social and personal service activities
Other service sectors
Real estate, renting and business activities
Ship breaking
Transport, storage and communications
Trust funds and non-profit organizations
Trading
Petroleum
Beverages
Cement
Telecommunication
Surgical and medical instruments
Footware
Sugar
Oil and gas expolaration
Power generation
Refinaries
Fertilizers
Agriculture- Rice
Agriculture- Raw cotton
Agriculture- Wheat
Miscellaneous Industries
The appendix reports the names of the regions and industries.
Bank Branch Car Loan Home Loan Credit Card
Alhabib Conventional 500/installment & check return charges of 500* 400/installment & check return charges of 500
Islamic N/a N/a
Askari Conventional 3% of amount due & check return charges of 500* 750/installment & check return charges of 500
Islamic No No
Bank Alfalah Conventional Min. per installment: 100/day or 1,000/month Per installment (for loans up to 1 million): 500/month 
[for average loan around 8% on unpaid amount]
Islamic No Regular rent on unpaid amount
Bank of Khyber Conventional As per sanction letter & check return charges of 500* as per sanction letter & check return charges of 500*
Islamic No No
Habib Bank Conventional 600/month 600/month
Islamic No No
UBL Conventional 1,000/month unless contract stipulates differently 1,000 unless contract stipulates differently
Islamic Max. 20%/year of the amount due [for a Toyota Corolla, 
5 year financing, 0% equity around 550/month]
N/a
Royal Bank of Scotland (merged 
into Faysal Bank as of 01-Jan-
2011; its schedule applies)
Conventional 600/installment, collection charges of 465/visit & check 
return charges as per schedule (0 in the reference 
schedule of charges)
higher of 1,000 or 10% of amount due, collection 
charges 475/visit & check return charges as per schedule 
(0 in the reference schedule of charges)
Islamic Same as above Same as above
Soneri Conventional 500/month for all products
Islamic Per agreement
Standard Chartered Conventional Up to 1,000 Up to 1,000 higher of up to 1,500 or 10% of amount due
Islamic Up to 1,000 Up to 1,000 & 2% pro month on amount due No
Appendix D: Penalties at the Conventional and Islamic Branches of Various Mixed Banks
The table reports the penalties by loan type at the conventional and Islamic branches of various mixed banks as reported on their websites in March 2011.  All amounts are in PKR.
Max.= Maximum. Min.= Minimum. No = not mentioned in the schedule of charges; The bank cannot charge anything unless a clause in the individual loan contract mentions a penalty. N/a= We could not track the 
penalty schedule, or it is not available. *= The bank receives undated checks from the borrower with the amount of an installment and when the customer misses an installment payment submits the check.
